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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(6) sets the maximum allowable amount of a
real property lessor's claim for damages arising from breach of lease.' To the extent

that a lessor's damages claim under nonbankruptcy law exceeds the maximum
amount, it is disallowed in the tenant's bankruptcy case. The implicit premise for
such disallowance is that real property lessors' damages claims are less worthy of
respect in bankruptcy than other claims for damages against the debtor.' Real

property leases are legally distinct from other contractual relationships that allocate
property rights But, it does not obviously follow from the distinction that a
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. II U.S.C. § 502(bX6) (1994). The section imposes a cap on the allowed amount of that
portion of alessor's bankruptcy claim that "result(s] from the termination ofa lease of real property."
See infra note 14. Section 502(bX6) is one of several bankruptcy provisions that alter creditors'
nonbankruptcy rights against adebtor as part ofa bankruptcy case. See, e.g., 1IU.S.C. §§ 544, 547,
548, 550 (1994).
2. See Sen. Rep. No. 95-598, at 63, reprinted In 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5849 ("(Section
502(bX6)] is designed to compensate the landlord for his loss while not permitting a claim so large
(based on alongterm lease) as to prevent other general unsecured creditors from recovering a dividend
from the estate."). See Nostas Assocs. v. Costich (Inre Klein Sleep Products, Inc.), 78 F.3d 18, 28 (2d
Cir. 1996) (purpose isto compensate alessor for the loss suffered but ensure that the lessor's potentially
"monstrous" claim does not consume the entire estate.); Inre Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 66 B.R. 337, 346
(Bankr. N.D. 111.
1986) ("[IJt ensures that non-lessor creditors recover more than the minimal portions
oftheir clams they would recover if landlord claims resulting from termination oflong term leases were
allowed in full... (and] ensures that lessors obtain a reasonable portion ofthe damages they suffered
as aresult of an abandonment of a lease by abankrupt.").
3. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the claims ofnon-debtor parties to unexpired leases are treated
under Section 365. I I U.S.C. § 365 (1994). See generallyCharles Tabb, The Law ofBankruptcy 57580(1997).
*
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damages claim for breach of a real property lease is inferior to other claims.
Because it discriminates against real property lessors' lost profit claims, Section
502(b)(6) contravenes the bankruptcy slogan that like-situated creditors ought to be

treated alike, or that "equality is equity."4

This article considers Section 502(b)(6) in light ofthe political, economic, and
legal forces that shaped it. Part I explains how Section 502(b)(6) applies to a
lessors' claim. Part III explores the history of real property lessors' claims for

damages in bankruptcy cases from the beginning of the twentieth century. Part IV
considers the stated justifications for disallowance of lessor's claims under Section
502(b)(6) and concludes that they are unconvincing. Disallowance of part of
lessors' damages claims under Section 502(b)(6) reflects and perpetuates irrational
bias against such claims. Moreover, such disallowance contradicts both contractual
theory and modem bankruptcy policy.
II. AN EXPLANATION OF SECTION 502(B)(6)
Bankruptcy Code section 502 governs the extent to which creditors' rights
against the debtor will be recognized against the bankruptcy estate. The process of
claim recognition or "allowance" has two facets, liquidation and evaluation. Claim
allowance refers in part to the process by which a court determines the present value
ofcontingent rights. A creditor's rights against the debtor might be fully mature and
liquidated; or they might be contingent on the debtor's default, the passage of time,
or the occurrence of some other event. These contingent rights against the debtor,
although not yet actionable under nonbankruptcy law, constitute bankruptcy
"claims." 5 Once bankruptcy law transmogrifies contingent rights into present
claims, it must also provide for the present valuation of such rights.6 Section 502
provides that, ifordinary resolution ofa contingency or liquidation ofa claim would
"unduly delay the administration of the case," the bankruptcy court must estimate

4. See, e.g., Allied Artist Pictures Corp. v. Allied Artist Television Corp. (Inre Allied Artists
Indus., Inc.) 35 B.R. 737,740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating Code purpose ofequitable distribution).
Professor Thomas Jackson described this principle as "perhaps the most common-and uncontroversial-ofbankruptcy's policies." Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits ofBankruptcy Law 29 (1986).
Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 82 S.Ct. 537 (1962); Kuchner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445,
57 S. Ct. 298 (1937); Canright v. General Fin. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 841, 844 (E.D. I1.1940).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5X1994). H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (1978), reprinted in, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6266; S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted In, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5807-08. "Claim" means a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured." Id. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (CERCLA
response costs are bankruptcy claims where release or threatened release occurs prior to the filing ofthe
petition); Grady v. A. H. Robbins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988). But see Inre M. Frenville Co.,
744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160, 105 S.Ct. 911 (1985). SeegenerallyTabb,
supra note 3, at 472 ("As long as the operative events underlying the claim took place prior to
bankruptcy, the creditor has a claim for bankruptcy purposes.").
6. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), (c) (1994); see generallyTabb, supranote 3, at 487-92.
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the amount of such claim for the purpose of allowance.7 The relevant moment at
which to value all rights against the estate is the filing of the bankruptcy petition.'
Section 502 has another function apart from claim liquidation. If a party in
interest objects to an asserted claim, the bankruptcy court must evaluate the merits
of the claim. The court must disallow a claim if it falls in whole or in part into one
or more ofthe categories set forth in Section 502. 9 The effect of claim disallowance
is stark. In a liquidation case, a creditor is not entitled to distribution to the extent
its claim is disallowed.'" In a reorganization case, disallowance dilutes the creditor's
voting power, and diminishes her ultimate recovery under a plan." In either type of
proceeding, if the debtor receives a discharge, the disallowed portion of a creditor's
claim is discharged and the creditor's rights are to that extent extinguished forever."
Disallowance also redistributes loss among claimants. It redistributes loss equal to
the value of the disallowed claim from the class of creditors would otherwise bear
it pro rata to the creditor in that class whose claim is disallowed. 3
Section 502(b)(6), the subject of this article, is one of the grounds for
disallowance. It establishes the allowability of a claim "of a lessor for damages
resulting from the termination of a lease of real property."" The damage claim
7. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1994). See generally Tabb, supra note 3,at 486-87. Section 502(c)
provides no detail as to how a court "shall estimate" a contingent or unliquidated claim.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1994) ("[T]he court... shall determine the amount ofsuch claim as of
the date of the filing ofthe petition.").
9. II U.S.C. § 502(b) (1994). Claims are "deemed allowed" if acreditor files a proof ofclaim
unless a party in interest such as the debtor, the trustee, or another creditor, objects. II U.S.C. §
502(aXl994); Bankruptcy Rule 3002(a). If such aparty objects, the court must conduct ahearing on
the allowabilityof the claim. I I U.S.C. § 502(b) (1994). See generally Tabb, supra note 3,at 482-87.
The delineated grounds for disallowance in Section 502(b) fall into three categories: (4) timing rules
(e.g., rights not in the nature of"claims" are notallowed), (2)substantive nonbankruptcy law objections
to asserted claims (e.g., estate succeeds to all defenses which would be valid under nonbankruptcy law,
§ 502(bXl)); and (3)bankruptcy specific policies (e.g., disallowing claims: for unmatured interest, §
502(bX2); for tax assessed against property ofthe estate to the extent the claim exceeds the value ofthe
estate's interest in the property, § 502(bX3); for services of an insider or an attorney of the debtor in
excess ofthe reasonable value ofthose services, 502(bX4); for spousal or dependant support maturing
post-petition that are nondischargeable under §523(aX5), §502(b)(5); for damages by areal property
lessor for breach of lease, § 502(bX6); for damages by an employee for breach ofcontract, § 502(bX7);
for certain employment tax, § 502(bX8); by a transferee of an avoidable transfer under certain
circumstances, § 502(d); for reimbursement or contribution that iscontingent or subject to right of
subrogation, § 502(e)).
10. 11 U.S.C. §726(1994). See also Tabb, supra note 3,at 467.
II. The holder of an entirely disallowed claim may not vote on any plan of reorganization. I I
U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1994). The holder of apartially disallowed claim may vote and participate in the
plan but only to the extent her claim is allowed. Id., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(2XB) (1994).
12. E.g., Inre Lindsey, 199 B.R. 580, 583 (E.D. Va. 1996). Bankruptcy discharge is codified at
1 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(b), 727, 944, 1141, 1228, 1328 (1994).
13. A real property lessor's claim for damages is treated as an unsecured claim. See II U.S.C.

§ 365(g) (1994).
14. Section 502(b) reads in part:
[Tihe court... shall allow such claim in... such amount, except to the extent that(6)such claim isthe claim ofalessor fordamages resulting from the termination ofa lease
of real property, such claim exceeds-
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subject to Section 502(b)(6) arises in one of two ways. A real property lessor can
experience damages as a consequence of the tenant's material breach of the lease.
Ifthe rent the lessor expected under the lease exceeds the market value ofthe leased
premises, the tenant's anticipatory breach of lease will cause the lessor to experience
lost profit.
Alternatively, a lessor can experience such damages by the operation of
bankruptcy law. Suppose a tenant files for bankruptcy relief while the lease is not
terminated.15 The trustee can either assume or reject the lease for the benefit of the
estate."6 The Bankruptcy Code provides that rejection of the lease is the equivalent
of breach under nonbankruptcy law.' 7 The lessor under a rejected lease determines
his claim for damages as though the lease terminated immediately prior to the filing
of the petition.' These damages "result[] from the termination of a lease of real
property" by operation ofSection 365 and Section 502(b)(6) applies to the lessor's
claim. "
As a threshold matter, Section 502(b)(6) does not affect a lessor's claim for rent
which became due but which the tenant did not pay prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. The lessor's right to back rent is distinct from his right to
damages resulting from termination. Termination ofthe lease extinguishes a lessor's
right to unaccrued rent."0 But, it has no effect on the lessor's right to rent which
(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater ofone year, or 15
percent, not to exceed three years, ofthe remaining term ofsuch lease, following the earlier
of
(i) the date ofthe filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the leased
property; plus
(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without acceleration, on the earlier of such
dates[.]
I I U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (1994).
15. The relevant bankruptcy term for a lease that isnot terminated as of the commencement of
the case is"unexpired." I I U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 1107(a) (1994); Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks Inc. (In
re Orion Pictures), 4 F.3d 1095, 1098 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1026, 114 S.Ct. 1418
(1994).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1994).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(i) (1994). Inre McClean Enters., Inc., 105 B.R. 928, 934 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1989) (claim against debtor for rejection of lease constitutes damages resulting from termination
under 502(bX6)). See generally Tabb, supra note 3, at 590. Bankruptcy Code section 365(dX3)
requires atrustee to pay rent due under an unexpired lease for nonresidential real property that accrues
post-petition but pre-rejection. I I U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (1994). Upon rejection, the lessor is entitled to
an administrative expense claim for the post-petition, pre-rejection use value of the premises. If the
debtor-in-possession assumes the lease, the lessor isentitled to treatment under Section 365. 11 U.S.C.
365 (1994). Ifthe debtor-in-possession subsequently breaches the assumed lease, the lessor's claim for
damages is allowed in full as an administrative expense claim not governed by Section 502(bX6).
Nostos Assocs. v. Costich (Inre Klein Sleep Products, Inc.), 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1996). See Thomas
Devaney, The Klein Sleep Decision: Section 502(b)(6) Lease Damages Cap as the Rule, Not the
Exception, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L.Rev. 557 (1996) (criticizing result in Inre Klein Sleep).
19. E.g., McClean Enters., Inc., 105 B.R. at 934.
20. Robert S.Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant 382, 383 nn.25, 26 (1980);
Restatement (2d) ofProperty (Landlord and Tenant) § 14.2 cmt. e(1977).
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accrued prior to termination. 2 Thus, a lessor's claim for rent accrued but unpaid
prior to termination does not "result from the termination of a lease of real
property." Although Section 502(b)(6) would not appear to affect this aspect of a
lessor's claim in the first place, Subpart B of Section 502(b)(6) expressly allows in
full a lessor's claim for unpaid rent due prior to termination of the lease.'
Subpart A of Section 502(b)(6) sets the maximum allowable amount of the
lessor's claim for damages caused by termination of the lease. To illustrate how
Section 502(b)(6) works, consider the following example. Suppose two parties
entered into a twenty five-year lease beginning on January 1, 1984 and ending on
December 31, 2008 for office space at a monthly rent of $1,000. The tenant paid
rent through July 31, 1997 but made no further payments. By its terms the lease
terminated and the tenant abandoned the property on December 31, 1997. Under the
lease, the tenant agreed to pay damages for breach of lease equal to the difference
between: 1) the present value of aggregate rent that would have become due but for
the breach; and 2) the rental value of the property during the remaining term.
Immediately after the tenant abandoned the property, the lessor was able to relet it
for $600 per month (60% of the original rent). On July 1, 1998, six months after
termination of the lease, the tenant filed for bankruptcy.
Under the lease, the lessor could assert a claim against the tenant for five
months ofback rent due but unpaid for August I through December 31, 1997. This
aspect ofthe lessor's claim will be allowed in full in bankruptcy. Although, as noted
above, a claim for back rent does not "result[] from the termination of a lease ofreal
property," Section 502(b)(6)(B) makes it clear that the lessor's claim for back rent
covering the period August through December 1997 (pre-termination) shall be
allowed in full.'
This lessor also experienced lost profit resulting from the premature termination
of the lease on December 31, 1997. If the tenant never filed for bankruptcy, the
lessor's claim against the tenant for lost profit would be governed exclusively by the
terms of the lease and applicable state law. The lease terminated with eleven years
remaining. At five percent interest, eleven years of monthly $1,000 payments has
a present value of $101,374. To calculate the lessors' lost profit, it is necessary to
subtract from this amount the present value of the recovered premises. In this
example, the present value of the revenue the lessor obtained upon reletting, again
at five percent interest, is $60,824. The lessor's lost profit on account of the

21. Schoshinski, supranote 20. Claims in bankruptcy for back rent were historically treated
distinctly from claims based on the lease. E.g., In re Sherwods, 210 F. 754 (2d Cir. 1913); In re
Chakos, 24 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1928).
22. I1 U.S.C. § 502(bX6)(B) (1994). The amount allowed is"any unpaid rent due under such
lease, without acceleration, on the earlier of [the date ofthe filing of the petition and the date on which
such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the leased property]." Id.
23. See discussion supra note 20-21 and accompanying text. See also Inre Atlantic Container
Corp., 133 B.R. 980, 987 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1991) (damages caused to the premises by the tenant's
failure to perform repair and maintenance covenants are unrelated to termination of the lease and thus
not governed by Section 502(bX6)).
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tenant's breach ofthe lease is $40,550.24 The lessor's total claim as calculated under
state law would be $45,550 ($5,000 back rent, plus $40,550 for lost profit).
Now observe the effect of Section 502(b)(6)(A) on the lessor's allowed claim
for lost profit in bankruptcy. In this hypothetical, the tenant's default triggered
termination of the lease under nonbankruptcy law. The "remaining term of such
lease," as that term appears in Section 502(b)(6)(A), commenced on December 31,
1997 upon the abandonment by the tenant and concomitant repossession of the
premises by the lessor."' It ends upon the natural expiration of the lease, December
31, 2008, eleven years hence. The total "rent reserved by such lease, without
acceleration" over the entire eleven year remaining term is $132,000.
Section 502(b)(6)(A) fixes the maximum allowed claim for lost profit as a
portion of this "rent reserved." The applicable portion varies depending on the
length ofthe remaining term. Section 502(b)(6)(A) states that a lessor's maximum
allowed claim for lost profit shall equal rent reserved "for the greater of one year,
or 15 percent not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such lease."2
Unlike the typical contractual or implied measure ofdamages which nets the present
value of foregone revenue and recovered market value, the formula in Section
502(b)(6)(A) fixes the maximum allowable claim for lost rent revenue (measured in
some cases by percentage ofrent, in others by the rent due over a set period oftime),
without regard to the actual or hypothetical market value of the premises.
Section 502(b)(6)(A) sets the maximum allowed lost profit claim as the portion
ofrent reserved that would accrue over fifteen percent ofthe remaining term ofthe
lease, subject to two adjustments. First, a lessor is always entitled to a claim equal
to twelve month's worth ofrent, even if fifteen percent of the reserved rent over the
remaining term is less. Second, a lessor's allowed claim for lost profit can never
exceed three year's worth ofrent, even if fifteen percent ofrent reserved is greater.27

24. $101,374 (present value of lost revenue) minus $60,824 (present value of premises) equals
$40,550.
25. Thealternate triggering events described in Section 502(bX6XA)(i) and (ii) describe mutually
exclusive occurrences whereupon a lessorobtains or isdeemed to obtain the exclusive right to possess
and exploit the subject premises. I1 U.S.C. § 502(bX6XA)(i), (ii) (1994).
26. The language ofSection S02(bX6)(A) is daunting. See LisaSommers Gretchko, Coping Wth
Rejection § 502(b)(6)-The Evolving Law of Lease Rejection Damages, 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. J.36
(1996) (Section 502(bX6) is"poorly worded and hard to understand."). In the same sentence, it defines
the maximum allowed amount ofa lessor's lost profit claim by reference to the aggregate amount of
"rent reserved by such lease" over a specific period of time, and a specific percentage of such rent
reserved. Inre Iron-Oak Supply Corp., 169 B.R. 414, 415-16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994). The cap is
stated alternatively in terms ofyears ofrent (at least I but no more than 3year's worth) or percentage
of rent reserved by the lease (15 percent). See Inre Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 145 BR. 823, 828 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1992) ("Congress intended the phrase 'remaining term' to be a measure of time not rent.").
27. For leases with remaining terms of less than 6.5 years, the maximum allowed claim for lost
profit declines from 100% ofreserved rent (for leases with a one year remaining term) toward 15% of

reserved rent as the remaining term increases. For leases with remaining terms greater than 6.5 years
but less than 20 years, the maximum allowed claim remains constant at 15% ofreserved rent. For leases
with remaining terms greater than 20 years, themaximum allowed claim declines from 15% toward 0%
as the remaining term increases.

1999]

MARIE T:REILLY

Returning to the hypothetical, the lessor's maximum allowed claim for lost
profit under Section 502(b)(6)(A) is fifteen percent of $132,000, or $19,800.8 The
lessor can add his claim for back rent, in this case, $5,000, to his maximum lost
profit claim for a total allowable bankruptcy claim of$24,800. The effect of Section
502(b)(6)(A) in this hypothetical is to disallow $20,750 of the lost profit component
of the lessor's claim ($40,550-49,800). The balance of the class of unsecured
creditors are correspondingly enriched by this amount.
III. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 502(B)(6)
A. Anticipatory Repudiationand Lessors' Claimsfor Lost Profit
Consider a real property lessor's rights against a tenant under nonbankruptcy
law." The scope of a lessor's remedies against a defaulting tenant depend on the
terms of the lease, and the statutory and common law of the relevant jurisdiction.
If a tenant breaches the lease, typically a lessor can: 1) terminate the lease
relationship and rescind the conveyance ofthe leasehold;3" and 2)enforce whatever
contractual rights he may have against the tenant for damages for anticipatory breach
of lease. 3'
The first remedy is essentially recourse against the leased premises itself,
analogous to a secured lender's right to foreclose upon the pledged collateral.32 The
second remedy compensates the lessor for his lost expectation ofprofit, ifany. The
two remedies are cumulative, but the lessor may not recover more than his loss on
account of the breach. Thus, a lessor's damages for breach of lease take into
account the value ofthe lessor's recourse to the property. When real property values
are stable or rising, a lessor who has a right to recover the property will probably not
experience lost profit on account of the tenant's breach. Indeed, in a rising market
the lessor will actually be better offby the tenant's breach. Recovering the property
allows the lessor to relet it at a rent greater than the rent under the breached lease.
When the rent for the breached lease exceeds the expected market value of the
leased property over the remaining term, however, the lessor will experience lost
28.

One year's worth ofreserved rent is $12,000 so 15% of the rent reserved is greater.

29. Section 502(bX6) takes as its starting point, a real property lessor's rights against the tenant
under state law. See. e.g., Kohn v. Leavitt-Berner Tanning Corp., 157 B.R. 523 (N.D. N.Y. 1993); In
re Lindsey, 199 B.R. 580 (E.D. Va. 1996).
30. The lessor's right to reenter upon the tenant's default can arise from a provision in the lease.
Schoshinski, supra note 20, at 377-78. Most states have enacted statutes that establish the lessor's right
to terminate the lease and reenter even in the absence of an express term in the lease. Id. at 377, 394.
See also Restatement (2d) of Property, Landlord and Tenant § 12.1 (1977). The Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act limits the lessor's right to terminate to cases of material breach by the tenant.
Unif. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act § 4.201, 4.207, 78 U.L.A. 493, 498 (1972). See
Schoshinski, supra note 20, at 4 n.10 and Supp. 1998 at 19 for list of states adopting the uniform law.
31. See generally Schoshinski, supra note 20, at 375-85.
32. The analogy between the lessor's right to reenter and a mortgagee's right to foreclose was
recognized in scholarly commentary on real property lessors' rights as early as 1933. See Wolfgang S.
Schwabacher &Sidney C. Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy,33 Colum. L Rev. 213,243 (1933).
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profit. Leases typically measure the lessor's damages as the positive difference, if
any, between the present value of rent that would have become due but for the
breach, and the present value of the premises over the remaining term of the lease. 3
From the foregoing non-controversial exposition, it is not clear why real
property lessors' claims for damages have been singled out for disparate treatment
in their tenant's bankruptcy cases throughout the last century. 4 What feature of real
property lessors' claims for lost expectation distinguish them from lost expectation
claims of other creditors? The history of the interpretation of real property lease
relationships in the United States sheds some light on this question.
"Lease" connotes a relationship in which the lessor conveys to the tenant a
possessory estate, while the lessor holds a longer estate in the same property." The
conveyance almost always occurs within the context of a contract regarding the
respective rights and obligations of the parties throughout the term of the lease. 6
In contrast, under the common law ofreal property, the lessor unconditionally grants
a leasehold estate to the tenant. And by "reservation of rent" the tenant

33. For an example of astipulated damages provision drafted to maximize the lessor's allowable
claim in the tenant's bankruptcy see James M.Hoffman & Douglas K. Hirsch, Don't Underestimate
Bankruptcy ClausesIn CommercialLeases, 9 No. II Com. Leasing L. &Strategy S-3 (April 1997).
Courts imply such a measure of damages when the lease does not supply an express stipulation. E.g.,
Kearns v. Gay, 232 F. Supp. 475, 479 (M.D. N.C. 1964); Piggly Wiggly Southern. Inc. v. Eastgate
Assoc. Ltd., 392 S.E.2d 337,339 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Bastian v. Albertson's Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1084
(Idaho 1982); Washington Trust Bank v. Circle K Corp., 546 P.2d 1249,1252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
34. See Collier on Bankruptcy, at 502.LH[3][a] (Lawrence P.King ed., 15th ed. 1998) ("from
a strictly logical point of view there should be no need or justification to treat leases differently from
other bilateral contracts...."); Max Radin, ClaimsforUnaccruedRent in Bankruptcy, 21 Cal. L. Rev.
561, 562 (1933) ("Whatever minute and subtle discriminations courts find between [a tenant's] rentobligations and his other debts, it is not apparent that the rent obligor-the tenant-feels any
difference.").
35. See generally Schoshinski, supra note 20, at I ("A lease is conventionally defined as a
transfer of the right of possession of specific property for a temporal period or at will."); Roger A.
Cunningham etal., The Law ofProperty 256 (1984); IAmerican Law ofProperty 177 (James A.Casner
ed., 1952). During the term of a leasehold, the land in question is subject to two estates: the tenant's
present possessory estate and the landlord's future estate upon reversion of the property to him at the
termination of the lease. Id. Before the sixteenth century, a tenant obtained no estate in land by virtue
ofthe lease. Rather, his rights were purely contractual. Leases ofland during this period were probably
used primarily as devices to evade usury laws. See generally I American Law of Property 175, 202
(1952); Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 367-68 (1st ed. 1928); Sir
Frederick Pollock, Frederic W.Maitland, History of English law 116-113 (2d ed. 1923).
36. Schoshinski, supra note 20, at 2-6. "[lit has been observed that a modem lease ordinarily
involves multiple and mutual running covenants between lessor and lessee, that the transaction is
essentially a bilateral contract involving a continuing exchange of promises and performances rather
than a completed conveyance of an estate in land or property." Id. at 4; I American Law of Property
§ 3.11 (1952). For an exposition ofthe ponderous evolution ofthe relationship between real property
landlord (lessor) and tenant see, Hiram H.Lesar, The Landlord-TenantRelationinPerspective: From
Status to Contractand Back in 900 Years?, 9 U. Kan. L.Rev. 369, 377 (1961); John F. Hicks, The
ContractualNatureofReal PropertyLeases, 24 Baylor L. Rev. 443 (1972); Hiram H.Lesar, Landlord
and TenantReform, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1279 (1960); Restatement (2d) Property (Landlord and Tenant)
1-6 (1977). See also Radin, supra note 34, at 563 ("[Tlhe relation of landlord and tenant is one ofthe
most perverse, complicated and irrational of all common law situations .....
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acknowledges fealty to the landlord." The estate is not conditional on the rent nor
vice versa because demise of a leasehold is perfectly valid even if it includes no
reservation ofrent.32 The independence ofthe demise from the compensation given
for it is the antithesis of a contractual relationship. 9
The presumption that the lessor and tenants' obligations are independent
dictates the remedies available to an aggrieved party upon the nonperformance of
the other. Absent a specific agreement to the contrary, the tenant's estate in the land
does not depend on his payment of rent. Thus, a lessor's only remedy at common
law for the tenant's nonpayment of rent is a series of actions for specific
4
performance-to compel the tenant to pay rent as it becomes due. 0
Of course, parties have by contract escaped the common law presumption of
independent obligations." By the beginning of the twentieth century, leases
routinely made the tenant's performance of his obligations a condition of his right
to possess the premises. And courts enforced the contractual dependence of lease
covenants.' 2
For reasons that remain obscure, American courts in the beginning of the
twentieth century did not embrace a completely contractual conception of leasehold
relationships. Courts treated express terms reserving to the lessor the right to reenter
upon the tenant's default in rent as a forfeiture of the tenant's estate. For that

37. John Emmerson Bennett, The Law of Landlord and Tenant 216 (1939). See Radin, supra
note 34, at 563. See generally P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom ofContract 317 (1979)
(discussing theory ofrent in 19th century England).
38. Herbert Tiffany, I Landlord and Tenant § 165 (1910). Tiffany noted: "The cases, however,
of ademise without any reservation of rent are but few, and the rights and liabilities of the parties in
reference to rent constitute an important part ofthe law oflandlord and tenant." Id.
39. E.g., 1American Law of Property 202-203 (1952); see generally Atiyah, supra note 37, at
208-09. The persistence of the unilateral conveyance paradigm in the interpretation of leasehold
relationships may reflect the fact that law governing estates in real property developed before that of
dependent contractual covenants. 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 890
(Samuel Williston, George J.Thompson rev. ed. 1936). Bennett, supra note 37, at 132-35. One
commentator disputes that at common law lease obligations were ever independent. William M.
McGovern, Jr., Dependent Promises in the History ofLeases and OtherContracts, 52 Tul. L.Rev. 659,
679 (1978) ("Rarely has aproposition about legal historybeen so often asserted with so little evidence
to support it.").
40. E.g., Oliver v. Loydon, 124 P.731 (Cal. 1912); Michaels v. Fishel, 62 N.E. 425,427 (N.Y.
1902); Sutter v. Goodman, 80 N.E. 608 (Mass. 1907).
41. See I American Law of Property 205 (1952) ("[A] large part of the job of drafting leases,
particularly where the bargaining power of the parties isfairly equal, is to draft provisions avoiding
anachronistic rules based on the idea that a lease is for all purposes and only a conveyance.").
Notwithstanding the absence ofexpress language in a lease, courts have abandoned the common law
independence of leasehold covenants in favor ofacontractual interpretation. For example, courts have
implied into a leasehold relationship a lessor's warranty that the premises shall be habitable. The
tenant's obligation to pay rent is impliedly conditional on the lessor's performance of this warranty.
Schoshinski, supra note 20, at 122-24.
42. See Schoshinski, supra note 20, at 377-78. See. e.g., Hiatt lnv. Co. v. Buehler, 16 S.W.2d
219 (Mo. 1929); Higgins v. Whiting, 131 A.2d 879 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1926). See also McGovern, supra
note 39, at 677 and 705 (observing that covenant dependence was common in leases under the common
law).
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reason, courts strictly construed the right to reenter against the lessor.43 Moreover,
absent language in the lease to the contrary, courts interpreted the lessor's right to
reenter and terminate the lease as his exclusive remedy against the tenant."
A lessor's right to recover money from his tenant (distinct from his right to
reenter the leased premises) was coextensive with his right to specific enforcement
of the tenant's obligation to pay rent. A lessor had such right only while the
leasehold estate remained intact. To get rent, the lessor had to forego his right to
reenter the premises and terminate the lease. To get the premises, the lessor had to
forego his right to rent, and with it any hope of recovering lost profit.45
A tenant Who defaulted on his rent obligation and abandoned the premises
posed a dilemma for the lessor. The lessor could tolerate the default and
abandonment and sue the tenant periodically for rent notwithstanding that the tenant
was no longer in possession ofthe premises. Because the lease was not technically
terminated, the tenant meanwhile had the right to possess the premises, and the
lessor had the corresponding right to rent as it became due. Although the leased
premises lay idle, that was the tenant's affair and of no consequence to the lessor's
right to periodic rent. Alternatively, the lessor could terminate the lease and reenter
the premises, but forego his right to revenue (rent) in excess of the current expected
market value of the leased premises (lost profit).
The lessor proceeded at his peril. Courts treated the tenant's abandonment as
an implicit offer to surrender (and terminate) the lease.4" Any post-surrender act by
the lessor of dominion over the property following the tenant's default and
abandonment could constitute acceptance of the tenant's offer of surrender by
operation of law. 7 The lease would thereupon terminate by operation of law, and
the lessor forfeit any further right to rent.48
In some jurisdictions, as long as the lessor did not reenter the premises, the
lessor could sue the abandoning tenant for the full rent as it became due under the
lease without reduction for the market value of the idle property.49 Other
43. E.g., Exchange Sec. Co. v. Rossinin, 186 P.828 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919) (under Cal. Civ.
Code). See generally Bennett, supra note 37, at 131.
44. E.g., I American Law of Property § 3.9 (1952). Some courts still take this view. See
Schoshinski, supra note 20, at 378 and nn.5 and 9 and Supp. 1998, at 222; 1 American Law of Real
Property § 5.06[2][a] (1994).
45. For the common law rule that alessor has no action or claim for rent following eviction and
reentry in the absence ofthe survival ofan independent covenant, see e.g., International Publications,
Inc. v. Matchabelli, 184 N.E. 51 (N.Y. 1933); Comwell v. Sandford, 118 N.E. 620 (N.Y. 1918); South
Side Trust Co. v. Watson, 200 F.50 (3d Cir. 1912).
46. See generally, Glen Weissenberger, The Landlord's Duty to Mitigate on the Tenant's
Abandonment: A Survey ofOld Law and New Trends, 53 Temple L.Rev. I(1980).
47. The lessor had no right to rent after the lessor accepts the tenant's offer of surrender. E.g.,
Minneapolis Co-op v. Williamson, 52 N.W. 986 (Minn. 1892); Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream
Co., 56 N.E. 903 (N.Y. 1900); Merrill I. Schnelby, Operative Facts in Surrenders, 22 Ill.
L. Rev. 22,
117 (1927); Charles T. McCormick, The Rights ofthe Landlord Upon Abandonment ofthe Premises
by the Tenant, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 211.(1925); Clarence M. Updegraff, The Element of Intent in
Surrender by Operation ofLaw, 38 Harv.L. Rev. 64 (1924).
48. Restatement (2d) ofProperty (Landlord and Tenant) § 12.1(3) and cmt. i, at 393 (1977).
49. E.g., Merrill v. Willis, 70 N.W. 914 (Neb. 1897); Heighes v. Porterfield, 214 P.323 (N.M.
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jurisdictions permitted a lessor to relet the premises upon the tenant's abandonment
without terminating the lease, provided the lessor gave notice to the abandoning
tenant of the reletting. o If the lessor did so, the lessor could sue the tenant for rent
reduced by the revenue obtained on reletting. The operative fiction in these
jurisdictions was that the lessor relet "on the tenant's account," preserving the
essential idea that the lessor continuously respected the tenant's superior right of
possession. 5
It is no surprise that parties to leases bargained around the confines of this
restrictive interpretation. Even injurisdictions that did not permit the lessor to both
reenter and sue for rent deficiency, (that is, obtain lost expectation), parties to leases
created such a result by bargain. By covenant, the tenant agreed that, upon default,
the lessor could reenter the premises plus recover from the tenant the difference
between rent to become due and the market value ofthe premises over the unexpired
term of the lease.5 2
Real property lawyers cloaked their contractual innovation with old rhetoric.
Tenants expressly covenanted to pay an amount, frequently denominated as "rent,"
as damages for breach of lease."3 The covenant, known as an "indemnity covenant,"
expressly survived termination of the leasehold.'
By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, the development of a
contractually-based right to damages notwithstanding termination of the lease
exposed an issue that had been lurking in earlier decisions denying such right.
Traditionally, if a lessor chose to ignore a tenant's default and preserve his right to
rent, he could not accelerate the rent to become due and sue for it all at once because
no rent became due before its time." If a lessor's right to damages was to be based
on a contractual covenant (rather than on the independent, common law right to
rent), should the lessor be entitled to anticipatory relief in damages, or be relegated
to the periodic, specific performance of the rent covenant?
1923); Goldman v. Broyles, 141 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 191 I). But see Benson v. Iowa Bake Rite
Co., 221 N.W. 464 (Iowa 1928) (duty to mitigate).
50. E.g., Baskin v. Thomas, 12 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Von Schleinitz v. Norm Hotel Co.,
23 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1929); Kottler v. New York Bargain House, Inc., 150 N.E. 591 (N.Y. 1926); Note,
Surrender by Operation ofLaw, 81 U.Pa. L Rev. 848 (1933).
51. Note, supra note 50, at 851-52.
52. Max Radin, Claims for Unaccrued Rent in Bankruptcy !!, 22 Cal. L. Rev. 1,20 n.42, 21
(1933) ('[m]ost leases do permit reentry and relettingand thus implythat the landlord has aremedy that
sounds in damages."). See, e.g., Hermitage v. Levine, 162 N.E. 97, 98 (N.Y. 1928); Kottler v. New
York Bargain House, 150 N.E. 591 (N.Y. 1926); Mann v. Munch Brewery, 121 N.E. 746 (N.Y. 1919).
California courts implied aright to re-enter and recover damages in apparent derogation ofthe common
law rule precluding recovery of both the premises and damages. See Oliver v. Loydon, 124 P.731 (Cal.
1912); Philips-Hollman, Inc. v. Peerless Stages Inc., 291 P.178 (Cal. 1930).
53. E.g., Kottlerv. New York Bargain House, 150 N.E. 591 (N.Y. 1926).

54. See. e.g., United Cigar Store ofAmerica v.Friend, 257 Ill.App. 359 (1930); Farley v.Craig,
11 N.J.L.262 (1830); Van Rensselaer v.Ball, 19 N.Y. 100 (1859); Kottler v.New York Bargain House,
150 N.E. 591 (N.Y. 1926); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 162 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1928). An indemnity covenant

expressly conditional on the tenant's default was described as "rare" ina 1933 article. See William 0.
Douglas & Jerome Frank, Landlords Claims in Reorganizations, 42 Yale LJ. 1003, 1006 (1933).
55. Tiffany, supra note 38, at § 166; Bennett, supra note 37, § 148.
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At about the same time that the indemnity covenant surfaced in lease litigation,
the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation had emerged in contract law.56 Upon one
party's complete and unequivocal refusal to perform executory obligations
(anticipatory repudiation), the other party could both suspend his own performance,
and enforce immediately his damage remedy for breach.57 Damages for anticipatory
breach were measured as ofthe time of the breach notwithstanding temporal or other
conditions on the breacher's obligation to perform.5" The remedy for damages took
into account the present value of the cost saved by the non-breacher in not having
to perform over time. 9
Anticipatory relief was thought to be unavailable to a party who had fully
rendered his performance.' Such a party was relegated to wait until the bargained
for performance would otherwise have been rendered but for the breach. To permit
such a party an immediate right to damages would give him more than he bargained
for.6 The fundamental schism between a lessor's lost profit claim as a corollary of
56.

E.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. I, 20 S.Ct. 780 (1900) (recognizing doctrine ofanticipatory

repudiation as federal common law); Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240
U.S. 581,589,36 S.Ct. 412,414 (1916) (declaration ofbankruptcyconstitutes anticipatoryrepudiation
of executory contracts) discussed at infra note 120 and accompanying text. See also Restatement,
Contracts § 318 (1932); 5 Williston, Contracts §§ 1296-1337 (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 5 Williston
on Contracts). Inthe first quarter of the twentieth century, the scope of the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation was the subject of scholarly disagreement. Samuel Williston, Repudiation ofContracts,
14 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 421 (1901); Henry W.Ballentine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of
Contractual Duties, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 329 (1924); Herbert R. Limburg, Anticipatory Repudiationof
Contracts, 10 Cornell LQ. 135 (1925). Williston disagreed with the doctrine. 5 Williston on
Contracts, supra, § 1321 (asserting that the doctrine enlarged the obligation of contract beyond the
bargain made by the parties).
57. E.g., Roehmv. Horst, 178 U.S. 1,20 S.Ct. 780(1900); 5Williston on Contracts, supra note
56, § 1314 n.Iand cases cited therein.
58. 5Williston on Contracts,supranote 56, § 1317; Restatement (2d) Contracts §348(3) (1977).
59. 5 Williston on Contracts, supra note 56, § 1350.
60. See, e.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1,17, 20 S.Ct. 780, 786 (1900) (the obligations of the
party to pay under "an ordinary money contract, such as a promissory note, a bond... [where] the
consideration has passed .... does not fall within the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation). 5
Williston on Contracts, supra note 56, § 1328 ("[N]o unilateral promise for an executed agreed
exchange to pay money at afuture day can be enforced until that day arrives."); Restatement, Contracts
§318(1932). But see Comment, Anticipatory Breach of Unilateral Contracts, 36 Yale LJ.263 (1926)
(questioning exclusion ofunilateral contracts from anticipatory relief).
61. Williston responded to critics who argued that anticipatory reliefought to be available to an
aggrieved party who had fully performed: "[Wlhen the only requirement of the contract is the
promisor's future performance it more obviously isunjust to hold him liable to action immediately, than
where performances are to be rendered byboth parties. Inthe lattercase, waiting until the agreed time
has its effect on the whole agreed exchange; in the former case, allowing the promisee immediate
recovery is nothing but a direct bonus to the promisee beyond -what he was promised and a direct
penalty to the promisor." 5 Williston on Contracts, supra note 56, § 1328, at 3734-3735. This view
persists. See Restatement (2d) Contracts § 243(3) (1977) ("Where at the time of the breach the only
remaining duties of performance are those of the party in breach and are for the payment of money in
installments not related to one another, his breach by non-performance as to less than the whole,
whether or not accompanied or followed byarepudiation, does not give rise to aclaim for damages for
total breach."); but see 4 Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts § 962 (1951) (the reasons for the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation "are equally applicable to unilateral contracts."); John D. Calmari & Joseph

1999]

MARIE T. REILLY

his right to rent on the one hand, and a contractual right to damages on the other,

fueled uncertainty and conflict regarding the application of the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiation to such claim.62 If the lessor's claim for damage derived
exclusively from his right to rent, then, absent an express damages covenant, the
lessor had no right to accelerate all rent installments upon the default of a single
payment.63 If the lease contained such a damages covenant, the lessor ought, in
theory, have the same rights as a lender under a defaulted loan with an acceleration

clause.
The emergence of a distinctly contractual right to damages for breach of lease
broke down the theoretical barrier to anticipatory relief for lessors. But many courts
remained steadfast in refusal to recognize a true anticipatory remedy for lost
expectation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, New York courts treated
lessors' rent based claims differently than damages claims. On neither claim did the

lessor win a true anticipatory remedy. Lessors who sought to accelerate their right
to rent under a technically non-terminated lease were met squarely with the common
law tradition that rent is not "due" before the corresponding period of possession
expired. Alternatively, if the lessor sought damages for breach of lease under an
indemnity covenant, the court would enforce the covenant only if the lease expressly
provided that the covenant survived termination. And then, the courts would
interpret the lessor's contractual rights against the tenant as narrowly as the language
of the lease would permit.'
For example, in Hermitage Co. v. Levine,"' the tenant leased a commercial
building in New York City for 21 years." After the tenant stopped paying rent, the
lessor terminated the lease and evicted the tenant. The lease contained an indemnity
covenant that preserved the lessor's right to damages following termination.67 The

M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 12.9 (4th ed. 1998).
62. For example, John Bennett in his treatise on the law of leases published in 1939 wrote that
the landlord could not sue immediately for damages when the tenant repudiates alease, but recognized
holdings to the contrary. Bennett, supra note 37, at § 148 and cases cited therein in nn.73 and 74.
Bennett explained the unavailability of anticipatory relief in damages for lessors not on theoretical
grounds but rather as a consequence of difficulty of liquidation. "Ordinarily there is available no
reliable basis from which to ascertain or compute the nature and extent of the injury which the lessor
in such cases will suffer upon a breach. It is this circumstance which commonly renders relief by way
ofanticipation unavailing ..... Id.
63. See, e.g., Jordon v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1952); Cooper v. Casco Mercantile Trust
Co., 186 A. 885 (Me. 1936); Maflo Holding Corp. v. S.J. Blume Inc., 127 N.E.2d 558, 561 (N.Y.
1955); McCready v. Lindenbom, 408, 65 N.E. 208, 210 (N.Y. 1902).
64. E.g., Jacob Ruppert Realty Corp. v. Bank of United States, 156 Misc. 93, 281 N.Y.S. 761
(1935); Hermitage v. Levine, 162 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1928).
65. 162 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1928).
66. Id. at 97.
67. The lease contained the following language:
In case the tenant shall be dispossessed or ejected, or shall remove from or abandon the
demised premises after a demand for the rent or the service of a notice as provided by
section 1410 of the Civil Practice Act, or after the commencement of dispossess proceedings, or for any other reason, the landlord may re-enter the said premises by force or process
of law or otherwise, and relet the same as agent for the tenant, and the tenant shall remain
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lessor relet various floors of the building to substitute tenants for varying terms. 6 "
A littleover a year after the eviction, the lessor brought an action against the original
tenant for the deficiency between the original lease rent and the rent on reletting that
had accrued up to that time.69 The tenant contended that the lessor's complaint was
premature.
Rather than arguing directly for extension of the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation to his claim for damages, the lessor asked merely that his claim for
damage be construed as though it were a rent-based claim-so as to afford him a
right to sue for deficiency periodically during the original term.70 Judge Cardozo
ruled against the lessor on the ground that the clause did not expressly permit
periodic recovery of damages. 7' The indemnity clause was silent as to when the
lessor could recover damages, and thus did not afford the lessor a cause of action
prior to the end ofthe original term, some twenty years away.'

liable for all damages whichthe landlord maysustain by any such breach ofthis agreement,
or through such entry or reletting.
Id. at 97.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.at 98. Inacase decided two years earlier, Judge Cardozo drew ahard distinction between
the lessor's claim for damages arising from termination ofthe lease, and for rent made while the lease
was still in effect. In Kottler v. New York Bargain House, Inc., 150 N.E. 591 (N.Y. 1926), the lessor
based its claim on aterm which permitted the lessor to reenter and relet the premises as "agent" for the
tenant if the tenant should abandon them during the term. Inthe case ofsuch reentry and reletting, the
tenant would be liable for any deficiency and entitled to any surplus between the original and substitute
rent. id.at 592. When the lessor sued for the deficiency that had accrued up to the time of suit, the
tenant objected on grounds that the lessor's suit was actually aclaim for damages (not rent) and was
premature until the expiration ofthe original term about one year later. Id. (citing the same authority
that later doomed the lessor in Hermitage). The court held for the lessor. Because the lease had not
terminated upon reentry and reletting, the lessor's claim was for accrued rent, not damages, and thus
was not premature. Id.
71. Hermitage,162 N.E. at 98 (citing McCready v. Lindenborn, 65 N.E. 208,208 (N.Y. 1902))
(lease therein obligated tenant to pay the difference in rent in equal monthly payments "as the amount
of such difference shall from time to time be ascertained."); Mann v. Munch Brewery, 121 N.E. 746
(N.Y. 1919) (after termination, tenant was to "continue liable for the payment of the rent and the
performance of all of the other conditions herein contained.").
72. Hermitage,162 N.E. at 99. To the same end see, Phillips-Hollman, Inc. v. Peerless Stages,
Inc., 291 P.178, 180 (Cal. 1930) ("law is well settled that the landlord cannot recover [damages] in
installments, but must bring his action at the expiration ofthe original term, at which time the damages
for the first time can be ascertained," citing Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 162 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1928));
Grayson v. Mixon, 5 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ark. 1928) (dicta).
Correspondingly, under New York law, the lessor was entitled to hold the security deposit for the
accountof the defaulting tenant until the expiration of the original term ofthe lease. Ifit appeared that
the lessor's damages would be less than the security deposit, the tenant had no cognizable action to
recover the difference until the expiration ofthe lease term. Halpern v. Manhattan Ave. Theater Corp.,
160 N.Y.S. 616, 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (plaintiff[defaulting tenant) not entitled to recover security
deposit "until the expiration of the period of the lease, unless every contingency under which the
defendant might have a claim for damages against said fund has been exhausted.").
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During this period, anticipatory relief for breach of lease was available to
7
lessors in other jurisdictions.' 3 For example, in Wilson v. NationalRefining Co., "
the tenant abandoned the property and the lessor relet it. The lessor sued the tenant
five months before the expiration of the term for damages equal to the difference
between the original and substitute rent to the end of the original lease term. The
tenant argued that if the lessor's action was for rent, he was limited to rent due and
owing prior to the time of suit. Alternatively, if the claim was for damages, it was
premature until the expiration of the original lease term. In Wilson, the court found
the lessor's damage action was not premature. "Such an action can be commenced
immediately upon the breach and abandonment, and covers the damages to the end
of the term covered by the lease."" In Wilson, the expiration of the lease was five
months away, compared to twenty years in Hermitage.
Given the economic instability ofthe last part of the nineteenth century, and the
onset of depression in 1929, arguments for the extension of anticipatory relief to
lessors for lost profit under long term leases could not have come at a worse time.
Even in those jurisdictions that recognized anticipatory relief, lessors faced a
daunting burden of proof with regard to the liquidation of such damages. Leo v.
PearceStores Co. 716 illustrates judicial discomfort with the level of speculation
required to fix an anticipatory remedy for breach of a long term lease. During the
year before trial in 1931, real property values in Saginaw, Michigan had dropped 2530%." The real estate broker testifying for the lessor declined to speculate as to the
7
fair rental value of the property during the remaining 18 year term of the lease.
The court concluded that although the lessor had failed to meet its burden ofproving
the fair rental value of the property over the remaining term, the lessor was entitled
to $7,500 "as representing an amount which will fairly compensate him for all ofhis
damages reasonably to be anticipated...
73. E.g., Grayson v. Mixon, 5 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1928); Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 157 A.
432 (Del. 1931); Wilson v. National Ref. Co., 266 P. 941 (Kan. 1928); Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 57
F.2d 340 (E.D. Mich. 1932); Novak v. Fontaine Furniture Co., 146 A. 525 (N.H. 1929); Womble v.
Leigh, 142 S.E. 17 (N.C. 1928); In re Reading Iron Works, 24 A. 617 (Pa. 1892). The measure of
damages for anticipatory breach of lease was governed by the leases in question, which typically set
such damages as the difference between the rent reserved and the fair rental value of the premises for
the balance of the term. E.g., Grayson, 5 S.W.2d 312, Wilson, 266 P.941; Scott Realty Co. v. United
Amusement Co., 162 N.W. 283 (Mich. 1917).
74. 266 P.941 (Kan. 1928).
75. Id. at 942. See alsoWomble v. Leigh, 142 S.E.17, 18 (N.C. 1928); Leo v. Pearce Stores Co.,
57 F.2d 340, 341 (E.D. MI 1932) ('It is well settled that the proper measure of damages presently
recoverable ...is the present value of the difference between the fair rental value, at the time of such
breach, of the leased prerises for the balance of the unexpired term and the total agreed rent for such
unexpired term."); Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 76 N.W. 1024,1026 (Minn. 1898); Brown
v Hayes, 159 P. 89 (Wash. 1916); Novak v. Fontaine Furniture Co., 146 A. 525 (N.H. 1929): Weir v.
Cooper, 84 So. 184 (Miss. 1920) (anticipatory relief available to lessor against sharecropping tenant).
76. 57 F.2d 340 (E.D. Mich. 1932).
77. Id. at 341.
78. Id. The court took judicial notice ofprevailing "abnormally low" real property values. Id.
79. Id. at 342. The lessor's rights arose in the context of an equitable receivership of the tenant,
and the court explained its award as an appropriate exercise ofits equitable powers. Id.
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B. Lessors' Claims in Bankruptcy Cases

From the turn of the twentieth century to the end of the 1930's, real property
lessors' claims for lost profit posed a particularly thorny problem in bankruptcy
cases. Intermittent periods ofsharp deflation and the depression of the 1930's sent
individuals and businesses reeling as fixed costs like rent outpaced deflated
revenue." Those facing financial collapse sought relief under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898. Individual debtors wanted to wipe away debt in the bankruptcy proceeding

and start fresh."' Creditors wanted to maximize their recovery and deflect the loss
in value caused by general deflation.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, when a tenant sought relief in bankruptcy,
the threshold question for the lessor was whether his lost profit claim would be
"provable" in the tenant's case. 2 Ifthe lessor's rights constituted a provable claim,

the lessor could share in the estate as an unsecured creditor." If his rights were not
"provable" and the trustee did not assume the lease for the benefit of the estate,
the
lessor would receive no distribution, but his rights would survive the bankruptcy

proceeding. The debtor's bankruptcy discharge would not bar enforcement ofhis
rights." A lessor's nonprovable claim would similarly survive a corporate
bankruptcy. However, the post-bankruptcy corporate tenant was likely to be an

empty shell, unable to respond to damages meaningfully.8 5
Prior to amendment in 1934, Section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 set
forth five classes of provable claims." Provability of the lessor's claim was to be
80. See Douglas &Frank, supra note 54, at 1003 (the authors observed that for some chain stores,
rent soared to 25% of gross revenue); Schwabacher &Weinstein, supranote 32, at 213 (deflation from
1930-33 included collapse of incomes and rental values. "Leases made in boom days, whether for
residence or business, have become major economic burdens.").
81. E.g., Womble v.Leigh, 142 S.E. 17,17-18 (N.C. 1928) (tenant abandoned property and told
lessor's lawyer "he was going to lock the door and walk out; that [the lessor] could do what she pleased;
that she couldn't get anything out of her contract, as he was going into bankruptcy.").
82. The modem analog for "provability" is whether a creditor has a bankruptcy "claim" against
the debtor as that term is defined under Section 101(5). 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994). See also supra
notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text. For a comparative discussion oflaw governing provability of
claims in equity receiverships, see Douglas & Frank, supra note 54, at 1006-07.
83. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 33 S.Ct. 365 (1913).
84. Section 17 ofthe Bankruptcy Act of1898 provided for the discharge ofonly those claims that
were "provable." 42 Stat. 354 (1922).
85. See Inre Portage Rubber Co., 296 F. 289, 292 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 604,45 S.
Ct. 91 (1924) (judicial notice that few creditors with nonprovable claims ever collect anything after
bankruptcy).
86. "Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are (1)a fixed
liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not... ; (2)due as costs taxable against an
involuntary bankrupt who was at the time of the filing of the petition against him plaintiff in a cause
ofaction which would pass to the trustee and which the trustee declines to prosecute after notice; (3)
founded upon a claim for taxable costs incurred in good faith by a creditor before the filing of the
petition in an action to recover a provable debt; (4) founded upon an open account, or upon a contract
express or implied; and (5)founded upon provable debts reduced to judgments after the filing of the
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determined as of the time ofthe filing ofthe petition." As a rule of thumb, a claim
was provable if it was noncontingent and liquidated or could readily be liquidated
as of the time of the filing of the petition."
The rule of thumb was subject to an important qualification. The list of
provable claims clearly included some claims that were contingent as of the time of
filing. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 before its amendment in 1934 expressly
included among provable debts "a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or
instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing... whether then
payable or not .... "" The statute made a distinction between a debt that was
"absolutely owing" although not yet due and other contingent claims. The former,
although strictly speaking contingent on the passage of time or preconditions to
maturity, were entirely provable. Other contingent claims which were not so
"absolutely owing" were not provable. For example, under Section 63a(1), a
creditor's rights on an unnatured promissory note, although contingent on the
passage of time as of the time of filing, nonetheless constituted a provable claim."
Lessors' claims for unaccrued rent were not provable because the lessor's right
to rent, it was said, was contingent on more than the passage of time. It depended
on the continuous furnishing by the lessor ofthe superior right of possession to the
tenant."' Of course, this reasoning contradicted the common law presumption of
independence of leasehold covenants.' 2 If the tenant's rent obligation was
independent from the lessor's obligations, it would follow that rent would, be
unconditionally due throughout the term of the lease. Thus, under Section 63a(l),
a lessor's claim would be indistinguishable from a holder's claim against a maker

of a promissory note-"absolutely owing" except for the passage of time at the time
of the filing of the tenant's bankruptcy petition-and thus provable.
Characterizing the lease relationship as an exchange of dependent covenants-contingent and thus nonprovable--raised an6ther problem. If a lessor's
claim for lost profit was non-provable because it was contingent on his future
performance, then no reason existed to exclude the lessor from anticipatory relief
when the tenant repudiated the lease. 3 Recognition ofcontingency by virtue of the
dependence of obligation separated lease relationships from their common law
origins and planted them squarely within the realm of contract law.
petition and before consideration of the bankrupt's application for discharge, less costs incurred and
interest accrued after the filing of the petition up to the time of the entry of such judgments."
Bankruptcy Act, § 63(a) (1933). For the effect of the 1934 and subsequent amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act see infra notes 188-196 and accompanying text.
87. E.g., United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200,207,59 S. Ct. 811,815(1939); White v. Stump,
266 U.S. 310, 313, 45 S. CL 103, 104 (1924) (the "line of cleavage" is fixed upon the filing of the
bankruptcy petition).
88. Howard L Oleck, Creditors' Rights and Remedies 140-41 (1949). Prof. Oleck warned that
liquidatability of a claim was a "crude" heuristic "not to be considered conclusive." Id. at 141.
89. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 63a(l).
90. E.g., Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 35 S.Ct. 289 (1915).
91. See, e.g., In re Roth & Appel, 181 F. 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1910).
92. See Radin, supra note 52, at 13-14; Schwabacher & Weinstein, supra note 32, at 217.
93. See discussion supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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In bankruptcy adjudication, however, logic gave way to expedience. Under preamended Section 63a," a lessor could argue his claims were provable under either
oftwo grounds, set forth in subparts (1) and (4).9 Either a lessor's rights against the
tenant/debtor were sufficiently noncontingent under subpart 1 as to constitute "a
fixed liability.. . absolutely owing at the time of the filing... whether then payable
or not," or they were provable under Subpart 4 as "founded upon ...a contract
express or implied."
Suppose a tenant defaulted under the lease and subsequently filed for
bankruptcy relief. If the lessor had not terminated the lease prior to the filing of the
petition, the lessor's claim against the estate was necessarily a right to rent. Even
if a lease contained an indemnity clause, such right to damages was not noncontingent as of the filing because the tenant had not yet breached the lease. As
discussed above, a lessor's claim for rent was deemed sufficiently contingent to be
not "absolutely owing" under Section 63a, subpart 1. Moreover, because such
claims were for rent under a lease, they were not "founded upon a contract." Thus
they were not provable under Section 63a(4).
If the lease terminated prior to bankruptcy or if the lease defined the tenant's

bankruptcy as automatic termination of the lease, and included an indemnity
covenant affording the lessor with an immediate action for damages upon
termination, the lessor's claim would be for damages, not for rent. Because the
adjudication of bankruptcy constituted an event of termination under the lease, as
such adjudication, the lessor would have a noncontingent right to damages. The
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation would arguably apply to render such a claim
"absolutely owing" as of the time of the filing of the bankruptcy case.97
Alternatively, such a claim would appear to be provable under Section 63a(4), as
"founded upon a contract." But, not so.
The watershed case was In re Roth &Appel." The lease at issue defined the
tenant's bankruptcy as an event of default triggering the lessor's right to reenter. 99
94. In 1934, Congress amended Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 63a to render lessors' lost profit
claims provable in part. See Infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text. The 1934 amendment to
Section 63a resolved the controversy regarding the effect of claim contingency on provability. Subpart
7 added to Section 63a read: "Provable debts shall include: ... (7) claims for damages respecting
executory contracts including future rents ... [but, subject to cap on lessors' claim]." Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, § 63a, I I U.S.C. § 103a, 30 Stat. 562 (1909).
95. See supra note 86.
96. Id.
97. Absent alease clause makingbankruptcy adjudication an event of termination, tenants on the
verge ofbankruptcy had an incentive to ensure that their lease was not in default to prevent aprovable
claim in favor of the lessor. William O. Douglas and Jerome Frank described common debtor/tenant
strategy in advance of bankruptey. "With meticulous care the lawyers for the tenant saw to it that the
rent was paid in advance just prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Accordingly, .. . at the
time of the filing... there was no provable claim." Douglas & Frank, supra note 54, at 1003-04. The
Supreme Court in 1916 held that bankruptcy constituted anticipatory repudiation ofcontract, effectively
closing this loophole. See Infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
98. 181 F. 667 (2d Cir. 1910). See Douglas &Frank, supra note 54,at 104 n.3 (describingRoth
as the "leading case" requiring non-contingency for claim provability).
99. 181 F. at 668. Under modem bankruptcy law, aterm that terminates an otherwise unexpired
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Upon such default, the lease obligated the tenant to pay an amount equal to rent
reserved under the lease, less the amount the lessor might obtain by reletting.Iec The
lessor asserted a bankruptcy claim in an amount equal to rent that would have
become due, less revenue from the substitute lease from the time the substitute
lessee took possession of the premises until February 1909 (although the lease term
expired in 1913).'0t
The Second Circuit held that to the extent the lessor's claim was for rent less
revenue from reletting, it was not provable. The court reaffirmed the traditional
view that a real property lessor had no right to accelerate the rent reserved under the
lease upon the tenant's nonpayment of rent.' I e The tenant's obligation to pay rent
following bankruptcy was contingent on the tenant's continued superior right to
possess the premises.' Thus, as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the lessor
had no claim for rent "absolutely due and owing" and thus, no provable claim under
Section 63a(l).'0
The Second Circuit recognized that the lease in question was "unusual" in that
it contained an indemnity clause that expressly reserved for the lessor the option to
reenter and terminate the lease upon the tenant's bankruptcy and also sue for
°
damages.' 5 Thus, the lessor's claim was not for rent, per se. ' Rather, the Second
Circuit characterized the lessor's claim as "founded upon an agreement to indemnify
a landlord for loss of rents following bankruptcy."'"
The court expressly considered the provability of the lessor's claim for damages
a contract." 03 It held that the parties
under Section 63a(4) as one "founded upon ...
lease "ipso facto" upon the tenant's bankruptcy is not enforceable against the trustee or debtor in
possession who may assume the lease notwithstanding such clause. II U.S.C. § 365(1994). Moreover,
rejection of an unexpired lease constitutes breach by anticipatory repudiation ofsuch lease regardless

of the absence of such clause in the lease. Id.
100. 181F. at668.
The significance ofFebruary 1909 is unclear from the opinion. The term ofthe original lease
101.
was not set to expire until February 1913. Id. at 668.
102. Id. at669.
103. Id.

104.

Id.

105. Id.at 671. Presumably this termwas included to obtain the benefitofanticipatory reliefupon
the adjudication ofbankruptcy ofthe tenant. The lessor could argue that his bankruptcy claim was for
damages and was fully accrued and non-contingent as of termination which occurred simultaneously
upon the filing ofthe petition. The Second Circuit noted asplit ofauthority on the question ofwhether
the tenant's bankruptcy constituted a termination (or anticipatory repudiation) of the lease absent an
express lease clause to that effect. Id. at 670. Compare In re Jefferson, 93 F. 948 (D. Ky. 1899); In re
Hayes, 117 F. 879 (W.D. Ky. 1902) (bankruptcy terminates lease) with Watson v. Merrill, 136 F. 359
(8th Cir. 1905).
106. It appears that the referee and district court below treated the lessor's claim exclusively as one
for rent to become due following the filing of the petition. 181 F. at 670.

107. Id. at671.
108. "The question... is... whether aclaim founded upon an agreement to indemnify a landlord
for loss of rents following bankruptcy is provable." Id. The Second Circuit's willingness to consider
a post-termination damages provision in a lease as creating contractualliability departed from the
earlier view of the Eighth Circuit in Watson v. Merrill, 136 F.359 (8th Cir. 1905). Inthat case, the
lessor asserted aclaim for damages for breach of the lease in its tenant's bankruptcy case. Id. at 360.
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to a lease could agree that bankruptcy shall terminate the lease and accelerate all
future installments ofrent."° "Not improbably," the court held, "claims based upon
such leases are provable inbankruptcy."' " The court then distinguished the lessor's
claim from those possibly provable claims. The covenant deemed the lease
terminated upon the lessor's reentry,which the lessor was entitled to do upon the
tenant's adjudication of bankruptcy. The court found it significant that the clause
did not requirethe lessor to terminate the lease upon the tenant's bankruptcy, but
merely gave the lessor the option to do so. "[T]he lessor was not obliged to re-enter,
and [as of the adjudication of bankruptcy) whether he would do so or not was
manifestly dependent upon uncertainties."' " Thus, the lessor's claim for damages
was, by the terms ofthe lease, expressly contingent on the lessor's post-petition act
to terminate the lease. The court imported the requirement of "absolutely owing"
from Section 63a(l) into Section 63a(4)." 2 Because the lessor had not re-entered
as of the bankruptcy filing, his claim was not "absolutely owing" at that time. Thus,
it was not provable as "founded upon a contract" under Section 63a(4).Y"
The court in In reRoth &Appel did not interpret the lease covenant in question
under the law of any particular jurisdiction. Neither its opinion nor opinions below
reveal whether or which state's law applied to govern whether the lessor's claim
under the particular lease was sufficiently noncontingent as to be "absolutely owing"
at the time ofthe filing ofthe petition.Y4 After Hermitagev. Levine, with which the

The lessor contended that the tenant's bankruptcy constituted an anticipatory repudiation of all

contractual obligations and that his claim was provable under Section 63a(4) as "founded upon... a
contract." Id. The Eighth Circuit had held that regardless of how the lessor characterized the claim,
it was for rent to accrue post-petition, and therefore, was not provable. Id.
109. I81F. at671.
110. Id. (citing In re Pittsburgh Drug Co., 164 F. 482 (W.D. Pa. 1908)) (lease provided rent
acceleration clause upon tenant's default; on bankruptcy of tenant, the entire rent was "a fixed liability
absolutely owing" and provable against the tenant/debtor's estate).
Ill. 181 F. at 671-72. Apparently, lessors at the time preferred to reserve the option to treat a lease
as terminated upon the tenant's default rather than render default an automatic event of termination.
See Radin, supra note 34, at 561.
112. See also In re Huchcraft, 247 F. 187 (E.D. Ky. 1917); Colman Co. v. Withoft (In re Sweeney),
195 F. 250 (9th Cir. 1912); In re Pettingill & Co., 137 F. 143 (D. Mass. 1905); First Nat'l Bank of
Pikeville v. Elliot, 19 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1927). See Schwabacher & Weinstein, supra note 32, at 21721 ("The history ofbankruptcy legislation both in England and in the United States pointed to such a
result, for never had proof ofcontingent claims been allowed under statutes which like the [Bankruptcy
Act of 18981 made no express provision therefor; and statutes designed to permit proof ofsuch claims
had been construed in aruthlessly narrow and technical fashion."). But see Moch v. Market St. Nat'l
Bank, 107 F. 897, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1901) (claim against endorser/debtor held provable under Section
63a(4) notwithstanding contingency: "The first and fourth subdivisions of section 63 are distinct
provisions, and are, we think, independent of each other.").
113. In re Roth & Appel, 181 F. 667,673 (2d Cir. 1910) (citing Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340,
345,350, 23 S. Ct. 757,759,761 (1903) (claim ofdivorced wife in estate offormer husband under an
contract to pay an annuity to her "during her life or until she remarries" held not provable under Section
63a(4) (and thus notdischargeable by the husband) on grounds that the contingency of her remarriage
rendered the claim "substantially impossible" to value or estimate)).
114. See also Watson v. Merrill, 136 F. 359(8th Cir. 1905); InreBissinger. S F.2d 106 (N.D. Ohio
1925). Other federal courts were careful to apply the common law of the state whose law governed the
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Second Circuit was no doubt familiar, a lessor had no immediate right to
anticipatory relief upon termination of a lease (and certainly no such right upon the
tenant's default prior to termination).-"'
Recall that if a claim was not provable, it was not dischargeable and survived
the debtor's bankruptcy case." 6 The Roth court's narrow reading of Section 63a(4)
to exclude from provability contract claims that were contingent on breach at the
time of the filing of the petition correspondingly decreased the range ofobligations
dischargeable in the debtor's bankruptcy case.
This narrow interpretation of Section 63a(4) adopted by the Second Circuit in
In reRoth & Appel did not last long. Five years later, in Williams v. UnitedStates
Guaranty &FidelityCo.," 7 the Supreme Court held that a surety's claim against his
indemnitor, although contingent on the default of the indemnitor, could be provable
as "founded upon a contract" under Section 63a(4) even though it was not
"absolutely due and owing" at the time of the filing of the petition."' The decision
in Williams was based on the peculiar nature ofthe suretyship relationships at issue
and the special statutory provisions that governed them. For this reason, the case did
not completely put to rest the question of whether all contingent contract claims
were provable under Section 63a(4)."'
In CentralTrust Companyof lllinoisv. ChicagoAuditoriumAssociation,120 the
Supreme Court blew open the threshold for provability of bankruptcy claims. The
Court held that the filing of a bankruptcy case constituted anticipatory breach of all
contracts, eliminated as a matter. of law any contingency regarding the debtor's
default, and rendered provable creditors' consequent claims for damages.' Prior
to Chicago Auditorium, the federal courts were in conflict on the effect of
bankruptcy as anticipatory breach of contract.' " The Court resolved the question

lease to determine contingency. As early as the 1920', the Sixth Circuit proclaimed that it determined

the substantive nature of lessors' claims based on state law. Schneider v. Springmann, 25 F.2d 255 (6th
Cir. 1928); Wells v. Twenty-First St. Realty Co., 12 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1926).
115. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
117. 236 U.S. 549,35 S. Ct. 289 (1915).
118. In Williams, asurety attempted toenforce itsclaims for indenmification against apartnership.
The partnership asserted its prior bankruptcy discharge as a defense. The Court held that the surety's
indemnity claim was provable (although not proved) in the prior bankruptcy and thus discharged.
Although the debtor had not yet defaulted on its indemnity obligation to the surety at the time the
petition in bankruptcy was filed, it had defaulted on the underlying (assured) obligation at that time.
The Court held that the claim of a surety for indemnification, contingent on default of the indemnity
agreement by the debtor at the time the debtor's bankruptcy petition was filed, was nonetheless

provable. The effect of the decision was to render the partnership's defense ofdischarge valid against
the surety, thus expanding the scope of the discharge for the partnership. The Court asserted that
holding the surety's claim to have been provable in the prior case, notwithstanding that it was
contingent on the debtor's default, was consistent with Congress' intent that bankruptcy serve a
rehabilitative purpose.
119. See Radin, supra note 52, at 8.
120. 240 U.S. 581,36 S.Ct. 412 (1916).
121. ld.at589,36S.Ct.at414.
122. Id. See also supra cases cited in note 105.
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as a matter of federal bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy constituted an anticipatory
repudiation of all executory contracts regardless of the effect of bankruptcy on the
aggrieved party's rights under the particular contract or state law.12
The claim in question arose under a contract between Scott Transfer Company
and the Chicago Auditorium Hotel. The transfer company had agreed to make
monthly payments for the exclusive right to provide baggage and livery services to
patrons of the hotel. The hotel could terminate the contract upon the transfer
company's default without releasing the company from liability on its covenants. 24
At the time of the transfer company's bankruptcy and thereafter, it was not in
default. The trustee ultimately rejected the contract." The hotel asserted a claim
for damages in the transfer company's bankruptcy case. The trustee objected that
the claim was not provable.'26
The Court held that the debtor's bankruptcy constituted anticipatory breach of
an implied promise. It noted that bankruptcy "strip[ped] the [debtor] of its assets,"
and "precluded its performance ...

."

Thus, "it must be deemed an implied term of

every contract that the promisor will not permit himself, through insolvency or acts
ofbankruptcy, to be disabled from maling performance.... ."2 The Hotel's claim
was provable, even though technically contingent on the debtor's default at the time
of the filing of the petition."2
The Court in dicta suggested that lessors' claims could be treated differently in
bankruptcy than other anticipatory claims. The Court cited several lower court cases
for the proposition that bankruptcy did not constitute anticipatory breach ofcontract.
Among these were several real property lease cases." 9 As one commentator
123. See Schwabacher & Weinstein,supra note 32, at 239. At the time the Court decided Chicago
Auditorium, bankruptcy of one party would probably not have constituted anticipatory repudiation
under New York law. Phoenix Nat'l Bank v. Waterbury, 90 N.E. 435,436 (N.Y. 1910).
124. 240 U.S. at 586.87, 36 S.Ct. at 412-13.
125. Id. at 587, 36 S.Ct. at 413.
126. The bankruptcy referee and thedistrict court sustained theobjection. Id. The court ofappeals
reversed and ordered the district court to allow a claim in the amount of loss incurred during the six
months following the filing of the bankruptcy case on grounds that the contract permitted the hotel to
terminate thecontract on six months notice upon dissatisfactory service orchange in hotel management.
Id. The Court ultimately reversed the court of appeals to the extent that it limited the allowed amount
ofthe hotel's claim to six month's worth of damages. The contract term that gave the hotel the right
to terminate on six months notice was for its benefit and did not render the transfer company's
performance conditional. Id. at 593-94, 36 S.Ct. at 415-16.
127. Id. at 591, 36 S.Ct. at 414-15.
128. Although the Court rendered the Hotel's claim non-contingent as a matterof law, the claim
was unliquidated and as a practical matter, contingent on a variety ofevents yet to occur. Commenta.
tors at the time noted: "[Nlo one could say what the actual loss suffered on reletting could be until the
end ofthe contract term." Schwabacher &Weinstein, supranote 32, at 233.
129. Colman Co. v. Withofl, 195 F. 250 (9th Cir. 1912); Inre Roth &Appel, 181 F. 667 (2d Cir.
1910); Inre Pennewell, 119 F. 139(6th Cir. 1902); Inre Ells, 98 F. 967 (D. Mass. 1900). In Chicago
Auditorium,the Court noted: "[lease cases) are distinguishable because ofthe 'diversity between duties
which touch the realty, and the meere personalty [sic].' 240 U.S. at 590, 36 S.Ct. at 414. See also
William 0. Douglas &Jerome Frank, Landlord'sClaims in Reorganizations,42 Yale LJ. 1003,1004
n.6 (1933) (criticizing Supreme Court's historical observation); Radin, supra note 52, at 9-13, 16
(same).
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observed: "This reassertion of the historical lease doctrine naturally cut down the
efficacy ofthe30 decision as a foundation for new law on the provability of claims for
future rent.'
The underlying motivation for the Court's holding in Chicago Auditoriummay
have been the desire to expand the scope of the discharge and thus the bankruptcy
relief available to debtors under the Bankruptcy Act.' 3 ' The Court may also have
been influenced by the widespread availability ofanticipatory relief in contract cases
under state law. 131 The treatment of bankruptcy as an event of anticipatory breach
achieved logical harmony with contractual theory. 13
In any event, with the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation and the Court's holding in ChicagoAuditorium, itbecame more difficult
to justify the non-provability of lessors' claims for lost profit on grounds that they
were contingent at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition."' Even so,

130. Richard C.Fuller, Comment, Bankruptcy-Proof ofClaimsfor Unaccrued Rent, 32 Mich.
L. Rev. 664,666-67 (1934). The Court dealt another blow to the cause ofprovability for lessors' claims
for lost profit in Gardiner v. Butler, 245 U.S. 603, 38 S.Ct. 214 (1918). This case involved a lessor's
claim for lost profit in an equity receivership (as distinct from abankruptcy case governed by Section
63a). After the receiver was appointed, the lessor reentered the premises and asserted a claim in the
receivership for damages measured by the difference between rent reserved and rent on reletting. The
lease contained no clause preserving the lessor's right to damages after reentry. The Court held the
claim was not provable. The equity receivership ofthe tenant did not give the lessor rights greater than
the lease itself gave. This conclusion isdifficult to square with Chicago Auditoriumdecided two years
earlier in which the Court held that bankruptcyconstituted anticipatory repudiation giving rise to aright
to anticipatory relief even when the contract in question was silent as to the effect of bankruptcy. The
Court in Gardiner distinguished the result on grounds that lease relationships were historically distinct
from ordinary contracts. Id. at 605, 38 S.Ct. at 214 ("[t]he law as to leases isnot amatter oflogic in
vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke." 1d.) But see Filene's Sons Co. v.
Weed, 245 U.S. 597, 38 S.Ct. 211 (1918) (claim provable in equity receivership under language of
lease).
131. InChicago Auditorium. the Court noted that the purpose ofbankruptcy laws was to "permit
all creditors to share in the distribution of the assets of the bankrupt, and to leave the honest debtor
thereafter free from liability upon previous obligations." 240 U.S. at 591,36 S.Ct. at 415. Expansion
of the range of provable claims enhanced creditors" rights, albeit minimally. Creditors of corporate
debtors were better off with a chance for adividend from the debtor's estate than a worthless right to
enforce a nonprovable obligation against aA empty, post-bankruptcy corporate shell. See Michael T.
Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection." 59 U. Colo. L Rev. 845,
871 (1988).
132. At the outset of its opinion, the Court noted: "It is no longer open to question in this court
that, as a rule, where a party bound by an executory contract repudiates his obligations or disables
himself from performing them before the time for performance, the promisee has the option to treatthe
contract as ended, so far as further performance isconcerned, and maintain an action at once for the
damages occasioned by such anticipatory breach." 240 U.S. at 589, 36 S.Ct. at 414. Douglas and
Frank observed that in the ten years preceding 1933, the trend in state courts was to extend the doctrine
of anticipatory repudiation to lease damages claims. Douglas & Frank, supra note 54, at 1007 n.18.
See also American Law of Property § 3.11 n.11 (1952).
133. Williston criticized the theory adopted in ChicagoAuditorium as inconsistent with contractual
theory. See 3 Samuel Williston, The Law ofContracts § 1327, 1987 (1920); 2 Samuel Williston, The
Law of Contracts § 880 (1920). See also Restatement of the Law ofContracts § 315 (1932).
134. See. e.g., Radin, supra note 52, at 7-9.
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although lessors tried, their efforts to prove claims for lost profit in their tenants'
bankruptcy cases continued to meet with failure.'

Parties to commercial leases honed their contracts to increase the chances that
the lessor's claim for damages would be provable in the tenant's bankruptcy case.
The key was to create a claim that was not contingent either as to existence or to
amount as of the moment ofthe adjudication ofthe tenant's bankruptcy.' 6 The first
such claim to reach the Supreme Court was that in Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust. 37
The parties had entered into a two-year lease that provided that the filing of
bankruptcy by the tenant shall "ipso facto" constitute a breach of the lease upon
which the lessor shall be entitled to "damages for such breach in the amount equal
to the amount ofthe rent reserved in the lease for the residue of the term thereof."'..
The trial court held the lessor's claim was nonprovable on grounds that it was
contingent as of the filing of the tenant's petition in bankruptcy."39
The First Circuit reversed and held the claim provable under 63a(4) of the
Bankruptcy Act. " 0 Before the Supreme Court, the trustee argued that the damages
claim, even if provable, was void as a penalty.'4' As a matter of federal common
law, the Court held that the lessor's claim was void because it was based on an
unenforceable stipulated damages provision.4 The use of an ipso facto bankruptcy
termination clause apparently removed the contingency that barred provability in In
re Roth & Appel. But, the measure of damages stipulated by the parties in the lease
in Kothe was supercompensatory, and thus unenforceable.' 43

The next year, in 1931, the Court addressed the question arguably left open after
Williams as to whether a contingent contract claim (other than that of a surety

135. E.g., In re Goldberg, 52 F.2d 156 (S.D. N.Y. 1931). Selective nonapplication ofthe doctrine
of anticipatory repudiation to lease cases provoked dissent. E.g., in re Bissinger, 5F.2d 106, 111 (N.D.
Ohio 1925), rev'd sub nom. Wells v. Twenty-First St. Realty Co., 12 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1926).
136. Some courts during this period expressed hostility to contract clauses which appeared to be
drafted to alter acommon law result. See, e.g., In re Leslie & Griffith Co., 230 F. 465,467 (D. Mass.
1916), aff'd, 251 F. 268 (1st Cir. 1918). See also Wolfgang S. Schwabacher & Sidney C. Weinstein,
Rent Claims in Bankruptcy, 33 Colum. L Rev. 213, 241 n.117 (1933) ("The common sense of courts
has occasionallyrebelled at allowing aclaim which would have been rejected but for its verbal cloak.").
137. 280 U.S. 224, 50 S. Ct. 142 (1930).
138. Id. at 225, 50 S. Ct. at 142.

139.

Id.

140. Id.
141. Id., 50 S. Ct. at 143.
142. Id. at 226, 50 S.Ct. at 143. The Court noted the moral hazard problem inherent in enforcing
promises that would affect the promisor only after he was insolvent. "The parties were consciously
undertaking to contract for payment to be made out of the assets of a bankruptcy estate---not for
something the lessee personally would be required to discharge. He, therefore, had little, if any,
immediate concern with the amount ofthe claim to be presented; most probably, that would affect only
those entitled to share in the proceeds ofproperty beyond his control." id.
at 226-27, 50 S.Ct. at 143.
143. Id. Hostility to penal clauses is adeparture from common law precedent where penal clauses
in contracts were enforceable. I Woodfall on the Law of Landlord and Tenant 449 (A.J. Spencer ed.,
22d ed. 1928). The federal courts generally rendered penaltystipulated damages clauses unenforceable
in non-lease cases. E.g., Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361,39 S. Ct. 303 (1919); Bassett v. Claude
Neon Fed. Co., 65 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1933).
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against its indemnitor) was provable under Section 63a(4). 4" In Maynard v.Elliott,
the Court considered whether a creditor's claim against an endorser of commercial
paper was provable notwithstanding that it was contingent upon presentment to and
dishonor by the maker and notice of dishonor to the endorser as of the time ofthe
filing. The Court noted without discussion: "[I]t is now settled that claims founded
upon contract, which at the time ofthe bankruptcy are fixed in amount or susceptible
although not absolutely
ofliquidation, may be proved under subdivision [63]a(4) ...
owing when the petition is filed."' 45 The Court explained that not all contingent
claims were provable. Rather, it was necessary to consider whether the liability of
an endorser was .among the class of contingent, but nonetheless provable contract
claims.'"
The Court held that a claim against an endorser was provable even though
contingent because a more narrow construction of Section 63a(4) would contravene
the basic rehabilitative policy of the Bankruptcy Act. 147 But, the Court carefully
limited the scope of its opinion. A contingent claim would be nonprovablewhere
the contingency is "beyond the control ofthe creditor, and dependent upon an event
so fortuitous as to make it uncertain whether liability will ever attach"' 4 or, if the
contingency "make[s] any valuationof the claim impossible.' 49 Thus, although
Maynardexpanded the range of provable claims to assist desperate debtors,'50 it
expressly recognized that some contingent contract claims remained nonprovable
under 63a(4).' 5' Unfortunately for real property lessors, the Court in Maynardleft
a cloud of doubt about the effect ofits decision on the provability of lessors' claims.
Contingency as to the existence ofa lessor's claim virtually disappeared as a bar
to provability after ChicagoAuditorium and Maynard. The claims at issue in both
ChicagoAuditorium and Maynard were contingent as to liability. It was, and is,
absurd to argue that one claim is more contingent than another contingent claim.
Rights that are "more contingent" than the rights in these cases are not likely to be
thought of as rights "founded upon a contract" in the first place, but rather as
expectations.

144. Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273,277, 51 S.Ct. 390, 391 (1931).
145. Id.at 275,51 S.Ct. at 391 (citing to Williams and Chicago Auditorium.).
146. Id. The view that an endorser's liability gave rise toaprovable claim even though contingent
on presentment, dishonor and notice ofdishonor as ofthe time ofthe filing ofthe endorser's bankruptcy
case generally prevailed among lower courts until First National Bank v.Elliott, 19 F.2d 426 (6th Cir.
1927). The Court explained that it accepted certiorari in Maynard to resolve a split the Sixth Circuit
opinion had created among the circuits on this issue. 283 U.S. at 275, 276-77, 51 S.Ct. at 391-92.
147. 283 U.S. at 277, 51 S.Ct. at 391-92. One commentator noted that Maynard v. Elliott
"legislated the contingencies of presentment and notice ofdishonor out ofexistence by holding them
unnecessary for charging the estate." Schwabacher & Weinstein, supra note 32,at 226.
148. 283 U.S. at 278,51 S. Ct. at 392.

149.

Id, (emphasis added).

150.

The Court held the claim ofaholder against abankrupt endorser ofanote was non-contingent

both as to existence and amount, and thus provable. Id.at 279, 51 S.Ct. at 392.
151. Id. at 278, 51 S.Ct. at 392. See Douglas & Frank, supra note 54, at 1004 ("hereasoning
and language of the Supreme Court in Maynard v.Elliott... isdirectly contrary to the reasoning ofthe
court in In re Roth &Appel....).
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Although claim coniifigency was not a bar to provability, the perceived problem
ofliquidating lessor's claim for lost profit before expiration of the lease termat least
arguably remained as a bar."2 Three years after Maynard,in ManhattanProperties
v. IrvingTrust Co., the Court again considered the provability of a lessor's claim
for lost profit. The Court held in two consolidated cases that lessors' claims based
on a tenant/debtor's breach of indemnity covenants were not provable. In the first
case, the lease contained a covenant that gave the lessor the right to reenter the
premises upon the tenant's default or abandonment if the tenant should become
insolvent or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors." After reentry, the
lessor could relet the premises for the account of the tenant. The tenant further
agreed to pay each month the difference between rent due under the original lease
and the rent which the lessor might obtain by reletting. "' The relevant covenant in
the second case was essentially the same."s6
The Second Circuit below had held that In re Roth & Appel governed and
granted the trustee's motions to disallow both claims as nonprovable. ""Judge Hand
writing for the Second Circuit expressed his view that Maynardv. Elliott... and
ChicagoAuditorium's9 rejected the notion that contingency of a claim or difficulty
of estimation ofthe present value ofpayments to be made in the future necessarily
barred provability."6 But, the Second Circuit, nonetheless, held in favor of the
152. Contingency regarding the existence ofaclaim and contingency regarding the amount ofthe
claim ifit exists are inextricably related. See Schwabacher & Weinstein, supra note 32, at 233. Inthe
case of the claim ofa lessor for lost profit, if the lessor isto have such aclaim at all, the market value
ofthe leased premises must be less than the rental value over the relevant term. Once this contingency
isrendered irrelevant to provability, the lessor must still establish the fact of liability and the magnitude
of loss to liquidate the claim.
153. 291 U.S. 320, 54 S.Ct. 385 (1934).
154. Id. at 328, 54 S.Ct. at 385.
155. In what was probably aheavily negotiated clause, the tenant agreed:
to pay each month to the Landlord the deficit accruing from the difference between the
amount to be paid as rent as herein reserved and the amount of rent which shall be collected
and received from the demised premises for such month during the residue of the term
herein provided for after the taking possession by the Landlord; the overplus, if any, at the
expiration of the full term herein provided for shall be paid to the Tenant unless the
Landlord within aperiod ofsix months from the termination of this lease as provided herein
shall, by anotice in writing, release the Tenant from any and all liability created by this
provision ofthe lease, which it isagreed the Landlord shall, at the Landlord's option, have
the right to do, in which event it is agreed that the Landlord and the Tenant shall have no
further rights and liabilities hereunder.
Id. at 328-29, 54 S.Ct. at 386.
156. Inthat lease, the lessor had the right to reenter the premises upon the tenant's default or if the
tenant should be adjudicated abankrupt. If the lessor did reenter, the tenant promised to "indemnify
the Lessor against all loss ofrent which the Lessor may incur by reason ofsuch termination, during the
residue of the term above specified." Id. at 329, 54 S.Ct. at 386.
157. Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 66 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1933).
158. 283 U.S. 273, 51 S. Ct. 390 (1931), discussed in supra note 144 and accompitnying text.
159. 240 U.S. 581,36S.Ct. 412(1916), discussed insupranotes 130-133 and accompanyingtext.
160. Manhattan, 66 F.2d at 471-72 ("Formyself... it seems to me that the basis of the doctrine
disappears once contingent claims are held to be provable. That has now been authoritatively declared,
and I think that we should make the necessary adjustments."). Ironically,the Seventh Circuit had held
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trustee on the ground that In re Roth & Appel somehow survived. Although
contingent claims founded on contract could in general be proved, lessors' claims
for lost profit could not be liquidated without speculation, and thus remained nonprovable."" The Second Circuit thus abandoned any pretense that the unique
nonprovability of lessors' claims for lost profit derived from a historical feature of
real property lease law.
Before the Supreme Court, the lessors argued that if their claims for lost profit
were non-provable, individual debtors would be denied the benefit of discharge, and
lessors to corporate debtors would unfairly be relegated to chasing an empty
2
corporate shell for satisfaction oftheir claims." The trustee argued that the lessor's
claims for rent ought to be nonprovable based on legislative history and judicial
construction that preponderately excluded lessor's claims for lost profit from the
class of provable debts.' 63
The Court recounted the treatment of lessor's claims for unaccrued rent over the
course of English and American bankruptcy law." It concluded that the failure to
expressly provide for the provability of lessors' claims for unaccrued rent "is
'
significant of an intent not to depart from the precedents disallowing them."" The
Court also noted that federal courts construing Section 63a "uniformly held such
claims were not provable debts."' It cited to its opinion in ChicagoAuditorium as
support for the proposition that it had neither passed on the provability of lessor's
claims for accelerated rent nor disapproved the rulings of lower federal courts
6
excluding such claims from proof.

The Court characterized the claims in the cases before it as claims for unaccrued
rent,and not for damages arising from breach ofindemnity covenants." Under the
two days earlier that a proof of claim for damages under a similar indenity covenant was provable.
Inre National Credit Clothing Co., 66 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1933).
161. Manhattan, 66 F.2d at 471. Hand noted the obvious fallacy in this reasoning after Chicago

Auditorium. Id. See also Note, Provability ofFuture Rent Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 Harv. L. Rev.

488,491-92 (1934).
162. Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320,331-32,54 S.Ct. 385, 387 (1934).
163. Id. at 332,54 S.Ct. at 387.
164. Id.at 332-34,54 S.Ct. at 387-88. The Court noted that although lessor's claims for lost profit
were originally nonprovable under English law, they were rendered provable by statutory enactment in
1869. Id. at 332, 54 S. Ct. at 387. In summary the American Bankruptcy Acts of 1800 and 1841
permitted proof of some contingent claims but did not specifically mention a lessor's claim for lost
profit. Courts construing these acts found lessors claims non-provable on grounds that they were
contingent as to occurrence and not susceptible of liquidation prior to the expiration of the term. Id.
at 332-34, 54 S. Ct. at 387-88. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 specifically authorized proof of a claim
for rent due up to the date of bankruptcy, but was silent as to claims for lost profit. Courts under this
Act held that lessors' lost profit claims did not fall within the statutory definition of "contingent"
claims. Other courts held that the specific provision for claims for past due rent precluded proof of lost
profit. Id. at 333-34, 54 S. Ct. at 387.
165. Id. at 335, 54 S.Ct. at 388.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 336, 54 S.Ct. at 388.
168. Id. at 337,54 S.Ct. at 389. The Court wrote:
Inboth cases, the lessor has the choice whether he will terminate the lease.... And upon
the exercise of the option by the landlord, a new contract, distinct from that involved in the
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leases, the tenants' obligation to indemnify only came into being by exercise ofthe
lessors' option to reenter upon bankruptcy. The lessors could reenter only after the
filing of the tenants' petition. Thus, as of bankruptcy, no obligation to indemnify
existed and none was breached. The lessors' claims were solely for future rent,
contingent as of the date of the filing of the petition, and for that reason,
nonprovable.
The Court's careful parsing ofthe terminology ofthe lease covenants presented
in ManhattanPropertiesv. Irving Trust was music to the ears of alert real estate
lawyers. By deciding the provability of these claims by scrupulous examination of
the lessors' rights under the respective leases, the Court preserved the possibility
that careful drafting could yield a provable claim for lost profit. 6 9
Lessors' lawyers hit the jackpot in late 1934. A lessor finally succeeded in
proving a claim for lost profit in Irving Trust Co. v. A.W.Pery.70 Like the lease
in Kothe, the lease defined the filing of a petition in bankruptcy as, ipso facto, a
breach and termination of the lease.' 7' Upon such termination, the lessor was
immediately entitled to damages equal to rent reserved, less the fair rental value of
the premises for the remaining term.17 1 The Second Circuit below had held that the
lessor's claim was provable and the trustee appealed.'"
The Supreme Court in a brief opinion, affirmed the Second Circuit. The claim
in question "arose and matured at the moment of the filing of the petition."' 74
Unlike the claim for damages in ManhattanProperties,'"7 the lessor's claim was not
contingent on the lessor's exercise ofits right ofreentry. Moreover, the measure of
damages stipulated in the lease, which reduced reserved rent by the fair rental value
ofthe premises, was not a penalty but rather "a reasonable formula for ascertaining
the damages of the landlord."' 76
original letting, becomes operative. While there issome color for the claim that bankruptcy
is an anticipatory breach ofthe lease contract, entailing adamage claim against the estate,
this cannot be true as respects these independent covenants of indenmity.
Id. at 338, 54 S.Ct. at 389.
169. See Comment, supra note 130, at 668.69. One commentator criticized the outcome: "The
far-sightedness of counsel for one landlord in inserting aparticular type ofdamage covenant ishardly
sufficient reason to allow him to prove in full, while another landlord, less ably advised, isdenied proof
ofany claim, since the real intention ofboth is,in practice, about the same." Note, supra note 161, at
493. See also Note, Congress Determines the Provability ofClaims For Future Rent In Bankruptcy,
22 Va. L Rev. 199, 201-03 (1935) (discussing particular lease clauses and their effect). Another
commentator speculated that theCourt was aware ofthe economic significance ofits decision and chose
to punt to Congress. Comment, supra note 130, at 671. See also Martin A. Roeder, Landlords,
Bankruptcy, and 77B,23 Comell L Q. 285, 289 (1938).
170. 293 U.S. 307,55 S. Ct. 150 (1934).
171. Id. at 309-10, 55 S.Ct. at 150. Apparently, ipso facto clauses were relativelyuncommon in
leases at that time. See Douglas & Frank, supra note 54, at 1006.
172. Id. at 310, 55 S.Ct. at 1SO. See also Inre Outfitters' Operating Realty Co., 69 F.2d 90, 91
(2d Cir. 1934).
173. A.W. Perry v. Irving Trust Co., 69 F.2d 90,91 (2d Cir. 1934).
174. Irving, 293 U.S. at 311,55 S.Ct. at 150-5I.
175. See supra discussion notes 153-157,160-168 and accompanying text.
176. Irving,293 U.S. at 311,55 S.Ct. at 151. See also Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597,
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Perryrendered legally distinct lessors' claims for rent (non provable) and for

damages for breach of an indemnity covenant (provable). Any historically-based
proposition that lessors' claims ought be non-provable in bankruptcy was officially
defunct. A lessor could prove a claim for damages in his tenant's bankruptcy
proceeding provided his lease contained an indemnity covenant that was
appropriately drafted to eliminate contingency as to the existence and speculation
as to the amount of his claim."
The possibility that a lessor's claim for damages might be provable in a tenant's
bankruptcy case created two problems that prior treatment of lessors' claims as
nonprovable had always avoided. First, once lessors' claims for lost profit became
provable, federal courts would be called upon to liquidate them, notwithstanding
s
uncertainty regarding market conditions over the remaining term.' Second, and
related, permitting a lessor to prove its claim in the bankruptcy case would
necessarily, and in many cases drastically, reduce the expected dividend to nonlessor creditors.
to a
During a period of severe economic depression, assigning a present value
79 Those
atbest.
imprecise
is
term,
remaining
leasehold, particularly one with a long
holding an optimistic view of economic recovery would contend that the markets°
value of real property can only increase over the remaining term of the lease.
less
38 S.Ct. 211 (1918) (in an equity receivership, lessor's claim for lost profit valued as reserved rent
rental value).
177. One year after Perry,the Court in Miller v. Irving Trust Co., 296 U.S. 256, 56 S. Ct. 189
(1935), held alessor's claim under a slightly different indemnity clause for lostprofit was notprovable.
The lease in question provided that if the tenant abandoned the premises, the lessor could reenter and
or as
relet for the account of the tenant, with the tenant liable for rent less substitute rent "on demand
it accrues from month to month." Id. at 257-58, 56 S. Ct. at 190. During the term of the lease, an
equity receiver was appointed for the tenant. The receiver took possession of the premises, then later
disaffirmed the lease whereupon the lessor reentered the premises. Id., 56 S. Ct. at 189. The tenant
filed for bankruptcy reliefabout one month later. Id. The lessor then relet the premises forthe balance
ofthe term for less than the original rent. The lessor's lost profit claim was not provable in the tenant's
bankruptcy case because under the indemnity covenant the lessor's damages were measured by what
actually transpired upon relctting. In Perry the lessor was entitled to recover the difference between the
the
present value of reserved rent and rent on reletting. The Court in Miller refused to interpret
ofreserved
values
present
the
on
based
damages
measuring
as
at
issue
lease
indemnity covenant in the
rent and an estimate ofthe present market value ofthe premises. Because the Court found the lessor's
damages in Miller were impossible to liquidate under the covenant at issue, the lessor's claim was not
provable. Id. at 258, 56 S. Ct. at 190 (under the clause in question it was, as of the filing, "a mere
matter of speculation(.] whether any liability would ever arise under it."
178. The court could postpone liquidation of the claim until the contingencies are resolved, or it
could estimate the present value ofsuch claims given the contingencies. See generallySchwabacher
& Weinstein, supra note 32, at 226-27. The first method impairs the speedy administration of a
bankrupt estate. The second method puts the contingent claimant on par with those creditors whose
claims are noncontingent. Schwabacher and Weinstein observed that the second method would irk
noncontingent claimants. Id. at 228.
179. SeegenerallyRadin, supra note 34, at 568,570. Professor Radin proposed an auction ofthe
unexpired term of the lease as the solution to the damages valuation problem.
180. Optimism appeared to prevail at least among scholarly commentators at the time. One
commentator noted: "Since the frequency of bankruptcies is highest during severe economic
depression, when the rental value ofproperty is at low ebb, it is probable that property values will rise
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Those with a darker view would contend that the bottom of the trough has not yet
been reached. Valuation of property during the depression of the 1930's thus
involved allocating between the lessor and the tenant/debtor's other creditors the risk
that economic recovery was not just around the corner. Valuation of the leased
property at its "low" market value would yield a large lost profit claim for the lessor
and would shift the cost of economic nonrecovery on non-lessor creditors.'
Conversely, assigning a "high" market value would yield a low lost profit claim for
the lessor and would shift the risk of delayed economic recovery to the lessor.
During the Thirties, the provability of real property lessor's claims for lost
profit was a significant economic issue. 2 Provability in full of lessors' claims and
the potential for lessors to overrun insolvency proceedings to the detriment of other
creditors was clearly a concern for courts.'8 3 On the other hand, lessors were
outraged at the ability of their tenants to use the nonprovability of the lessor's claim
as a means to strip down liability." In a 1933 article in the Yale Law Journal,

before the end of the period of the long-term lease. Consequently, aclaim for the difference between
the rent reserved and the rental value at the time of the filing ofthe petition, properly discounted, may
have very little relation to the damage actually suffered by the lessor." Comment, supra note 130, at
670. Cf.Robert T. Swaine, A Decade ofRailroad Reorganization Under Section 77 ofthe Federal
Bankruptcy Act, 56 Harv. L Rev. 1037, 1056 (1943) (observing that the Interstate Commerce
Commission delayed in administering railroad reorganizations during 1933-35 "until it felt that the new
lower levels [of railroad earnings) evidenced a permanent trend from which there was little hope of
recovery to earlier levels.").
181. An insolvent tenant externalizes loss he would otherwise bear to his creditors as a group.
Absent adifferent rule, creditors with the same priority participate pro-rata (on the basis oftheir claims)
in distribution with other creditors, and they bear loss pro-rata. To the extent that bankruptcy law
disallows all or part ofalessor's claim (as determined understate law), such lessor is disadvantaged visa-vis other creditors and bears adisproportionate share of the externalized loss relative to a pro-rata
allocation. See supra discussion notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
182. Manhattan Properties"threw into high relief the plight in which landlords found themselves
as a result of the flood of corporate bankruptcies brought about by the economic depression." City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 438, 57 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1937).
Commentators noted: "At the heart the problem is abusiness and economic one.... [Glrim economic
necessityrequires that rent not exceed acertain percentage ofgross revenue; in periods offalling prices,
declining sales and deep economic depression, financial readjustment is a prime necessity." Douglas
& Frank, supra note 54, at 1008.
183. In In reCollington, 4 A.B.R. 250,254(1900), the courtexpressed its concern that provability
of the lessor's claim for damages might squeeze out other creditors of the estate. It commented: "Any
other ruling ... would not merely tempt landlords to drag out the administration of estates in
bankruptcy, but often make it possible for them, through eleventh hour claims for vacant premises or
on fictitious relettings, materially to reduce the dividends of other creditors .....
Id.
184. "The situation ofowners ofbusiness properties leased to chain store organizations which had
resorted to voluntary bankruptcy largely as a lever to force revision of leases was the subject of
comment in and outofCongress." City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433,438,
57 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1937). For an example ofjudicial outrage at the strategy of using bankruptcy to
strip down lessors' claims, see May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. F. & W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores, Inc., 59
F.2d 218, 220 (D. Mont. 1932), rev'd, 64 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1933) (denying petition for receivership
and fining local counsel for the petitioning debtor for contempt: "employment of the judicial club to
beat off and hold up creditors until, wearied, they settle with or wait the pleasure of the debtor's
executive vice president receiver shielded by the judicial gown."). '
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Professors William Douglas and Jerome Frank observed that bankruptcy "has been
frequently condemned in popular thought as constituting nothing but a racket which
8s
ingenious counsel have devised as an avenue to escape from just obligations.''
C. The "LimitedSacrifice"
At the beginning of the 1930's, the scope of bankruptcy relief presented
Congress with a stark political problem. Individuals seeking relief in bankruptcy
were chagrined to find their obligations under real property leases dogging them
even after discharge. Lessors also were not pleased with their fate. Commentators
observed with understatement: "It is, ofcourse, not unnatural for landlords to find
little comfort in their theoretically undischarged rights against defunct corporations
'
when they are excluded from sharing in the assets. "
As early as 1932, Congress began considering changes to the bankruptcy laws
87
to respond to this problem and severe economic dislocation generally. By the Act
It
of March 3, 1933, Congress enacted Section 74 to the Bankruptcy Act.'
alternative
an
as
problems
permitted individual debtors to work out their financial
to total liquidation of their nonexempt assets. The last sentence of Section 74(a)
specifically provided for the provability of real property lessors' claims for lost
profit in these reorganization proceedings." 9 In the same Act, Congress enacted
Section 77, which provided for the reorganization of railroad debtors. '" The last
similarly
sentence of Section 77(b) was virtually identical to that in Section 74, and
9
profit.,
lost
for
claims
rendered provable railroad real property lessors'

185. Douglas & Frank, supra note 54, at 1003. The authors noted that while bankruptcy sparked
abuse, some response to insolvency was essential in light of the depression. "Falling prices and
declining sales make necessary ... areadjustment if the business isto continue as a going concern."
Id.
186. Schwabacher& Weinstein,supra note 32, at213-14 ("[Clhain store bankruptcies engineered
more or less openly for the purpose ofescaping burdensome leases without compensating the landlords,
have awakened interest in the status ofclaims in bankruptcy for rent accruing after the filing of the
petition.").
187. Inthe 72d and 73d Congress, Congress considered several ultimately unsuccessful billswhich
would have authorized proceedings for the reorganization of business corporations. See City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 438, 57 S.Ct. 292, 294 (1937).
188. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467, 1468 (repealed 1978) (hereinafter 1933
Amendment).
189. The relevant language read: "The term 'creditor' shall include for the purposes of an
extension proposal under this section all holders ofclaims ofwhatever character against the debtor or
his property including a claim for future rent, whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute
provable claims under this Act. A claim for future rent shall constitute a provable debt and shall be
liquidated under section 63(b) of this Act." Id. See generally Schwabacher & Weinstein, supra note
32, at 213. See also Cong. Rec., Senate, Feb. 24, 1933, pp. 5058, 5059; Feb. 27, 1933, p. 5278.
190. 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933). See generally Churchill Rodgers & Littleton Groom,
ReorganizationofRailroadCorporatlonsUnderSection 77 ofthe BankruptcyAct, 33 Colum. L Rev.
571, 572 (1933); Swaine, supra note 180, at 1038; 5 Colliers on Bankruptcy (I4th ed. 1940).
191. 47 Stat. 1467 (1933).
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By the Act ofJune 7, 1934, after the Court's decision in ManhattanProperties
but a few months before Irving Trust v. A.W. Perry, ' Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Act to include Section 77B, which provided for non-railroad, corporate
reorganization.*"' It defined "creditor" to include holders ofclaims under executory
contracts, regardless of whether such claims would have been provable under prior
law. The effect was to render provable previously non-provable, contingent claims.
But, the allowed amount ofa real property lessor's claim for lost profit was capped
at three year's worth of reserved rent."M
In the same Act of June 7, 1934, Congress amended Section 63a which
governed the provability of claims in liquidation cases."9 Like the treatment of
lessors' claims in 77B, lessors' lostprofit claims became expressly provable subject
to a capped amount of one year's worth of reserved rent.'"
Sections 63a(7) and 77B(b)(10) rendered provable lessors' claims "for injury
resulting fromthe rejection [by the trustee] of an unexpired lease of real estate or for

damages or indemnity under a covenant contained in such lease... ."' Statutory
provability of lessors' claims had several effects. First, the tenant's bankruptcy
constituted a total repudiation of the lease, codifying for lessors' claims the result
in Chicago Auditorium. 9 Following from this proposition, a lessor obtained a
statutory claim for damages resulting from the estate's rejection of an unexpired
lease even where the lease did not contain an indemnity covenant.'" In such a case,
the Court implied the measure of the lessor's damages (prior to application of the
cap) as "the difference between the rental value of the remainder ofthe term and the
192. Seesupra discussion notes 170-176 and accompanying text.
193. Act ofJune 7,1934, ch. 424,48 Stat. 911 (1934).
194. Id. Section 77B(bXIO):
The claim of alandlord for injury resulting from the rejection ofan unexpired lease of real
estate or for damages or indemnity under acovenant contained in such lease shall be treated
as a claim ranking on aparity with debts which would be provable under section 63(a) of
this Act, but shall be limited to an amount not to exceed the rent, without acceleration,
reserved by said lease for the three years next succeeding the date of surrender of the
premises to the landlord or the date of reentry of the landlord, whichever first occurs,
whether before or after the filing of the petition, plus unpaid rent accrued up to such date
of surrender or reentry.

195.

48 Stat. 923, ch. 424, §4(1934).

196. Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are...
(7)claims for damages respecting executory contracts including future rents whether the
bankrupt be an individual or acorporation, but the claim of alandlord for injury resulting
from the rejection by the trustee of an unexpired lease of real estate or for damages or
indenmity under a covenant contained in such lease shall in no event be allowed in an
amount exceeding the rent reserved by the lease, without acceleration, for the year next
succeeding the date ofthe surrender of the premises plus an amount equal to the unpaid rent
accrued up to said date....
Id.
197.
198.
(1937).
199.
affected

Section 63a(7), 47 Stat. 1467 (1934); Section 77B(bXl0), 48 Stat. 911 (1934).
See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 440, 57 S.Ct. 292, 295
Id.at 443, 57 S.Ct. at 297 (provability ofaclaim for damages upon rejection of alease isnot
by post-rejection conduct that would have terminated the lease under state law.).
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2
rent reserved, both discounted to present worth." " Because calculation of the

lessor's damages took into account the present rental value of the premises
following rejection, the lessor must be entitled to reenter the property following
the
rejection without losing his bankruptcy claim, even if reentry would terminate
"
2
lease (and the lessor's rights against the tenant) under non-bankruptcy law. '
In 1938, Congress passed the Chandler Act which further amended the
treatment of lessors' lost profit claims in liquidation cases.' The amendment did
not materially change the effect of the prior law on the allowability of lessor's lost
profit claims. 3
Scholarly commentators characterized the new law governing lessors' claims
2
as an improvement for lessors. " Certainly a lessor who could have proven his
°
claim in full under prior law was not better off." ' The inescapable effect of the
amendments on both lessors and tenants was to reduce their ability to allocate risk
by contract. No lessor regardless of the terms of his lease, or the magnitude of his
damages under nonbankruptcy law, could assert a lost profit claim in his tenant's
°

bankruptcy case for more than the statutory maximum amount.' e

200. Id.
201. Id. at 444, 57 S.Ct. at 297. If prior to the tenant's bankruptcy, a lessor had terminated the
lease without a surviving indemnity clause, or had otherwise released his nonbankruptcy law rights
against the tenant, the lessor would have no claim against the debtor tenant. See Schwartz v. Irving
Trust Co., 299 U.S. 456, 57 S.Ct. 303 (1937); Meadows v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 464, 57 S.Ct.
307 (1937).
202. The amendment deleted subparagraph (7)and inserted subparagraphs (8)and (9). Paragraph
(8) expressly rendered provable "contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities." Paragraph
(9)rendered claims for anticipatorybreach ofexecutory contracts expressly provable with the limitation
that a lessor's claim for:
damages or injury resulting from the rejection of an unexpired lease of real estate or for
damages or indemnity under acovenant contained in the lease shall in no event be allowed
in an amount exceeding the rent reserved bythe lease, without acceleration, for the yearnext
succeeding the date of the surrender of the premises to the landlord or the date of re-entry
ofthe landlord, whichever first occurs, whether before or after bankruptcy, plus an amount
equal to the unpaid rent accrued without acceleration, up to such date.
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
203. Id. The Chandler Act restricted real property lessors' liens for rent, exceptas against certain
other liens. 52 Stat. 840, 876 (1938) (§§ 67b and c).
204. E.g., Edwin S.Newman, Rent Claims In Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization, 43
Colum. L Rev. 317, 319-20 (1943); Note, supra note 169, at 204 (describing amendments as a"happy
compromise"); David E.Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate In Land ora Contract (Damagesfor
Anticipatory Breach andInterdependency ofCovenants), 16 Tex. L Rev. 47, 61 (1937) (rule "makes
for greater certainty.., and isa definite improvement .. ").3A Collier on Bankruptcy 1894 (14th ed.
1941) ("The statutory solution represented a happy medium and imposed on the creditors a limited
sacrifice in order to achieve the desirable end offacilitatingthe debtor's rehabilitation by extending the
scope ofhis discharge."). See also City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433,438,
57 S.Ct. 292, 294 (1937).
205. Lessors with claims like the one held provable in Perry were substantially worse off. See
Kuchner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 57 S.Ct. 298 (1937).
206. See, e.g., 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 1881-1907 (14th ed. 1941); Newman, supra note 204, at
320, but see Roeder, supra note 169, at 289.
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Despite commentary lauding the amendments, lessors were not pleased, and did
not see the justice of their sacrifice. In Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co.,207 a lessor

challenged the constitutionality of the cap on lessors' claims in Section 77B(b)
governing corporate reorganizations. In 1926, the lessor entered into a twenty-year
lease ofretail space with United Cigar Stores. Six years later, in 1932, United Cigar
filed for bankruptcy relief."' The trustee rejected the lease and abandoned the
premises to the lessor. The lease permitted the lessor to terminate upon
abandonment and hold the tenant liable for resulting loss. Two days after the
effective date ofSection 77B (reorganization), the debtor filed a new case for relief
under that section.2' The lessor filed a claim inthe new case for damages equal to
the difference between the reserved rent and rental value of the subject premises for
the remaining term.21 The court capped the allowed amount of the lessor's claim
at three years ofreserved rent as required by 77B(b).2 '
The lessor requested that any portion of its claim disallowed under Section
77B(b) be granted priority over stockholders' claims. The Court held that the
lessor's entire claim was affected by Section 77B(b) and no part of his
nonbankruptcy law rights survived to compete with equity interests. The disallowed
portion of the lessors' claim was entirely disallowed even against the interests of
stockholders."
The lessor argued that the imposition of the cap exceeded Congress' power to
make bankruptcy laws, and constituted a taking of its property without due process
of law.213 Without discussion, the Court held that the disallowance of lessors'
claims was indeed within the Legislature's constitutional power to make laws
affecting bankruptcy.2 ' Nor did Section 77B(b) deny lessors due process of law.
The Court declared that the cap on lessors' claims was rational. It considered the
history ofthe treatment ofreal property lessors' claims, and held that Congress must
have imposed the cap on lessors' claims as a middle ground between two equitably
207. 299 U.S. 445, 57 S.Ct. 298 (1937).
208. ld. at 447, 57 S.C. at 299.
209. Id.
210. The fair rental for the remaining term was $111,545. The reserved rent was $199,237, for a
difference of$87,692. Three years worth ofrent was $44,377. Id. at 448, 57 S.Ct. at 300.
211. Id.
212. Id. at450,57S. Ct. at 300-01. See Douglas &Frank, supra note 54 (arguing for imposition
on reorganized corporations of successor liability to lessors to the extent of their nonprovable claims
under Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504, 33 S.Ct. 554, 560 (1913)). See also In
re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 131 BR. 808 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
213. 299 U.S. at 450,57 S.Ct. at 300-01.
214. Id. at 451,57 S.Ct. at 301. Two years earlier, the Supreme Court had held the Frazier-Lemke
Act unconstitutional on grounds that itworked an unconstitutional taking offarm mortgagees' property
rights. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854 (1935). The lessors
in Kuehner argued that the cap in Section 77B violated the Fifth Amendment in the same way as the
Frazier-Lemke Act did. The Court distinguished Radford on grounds that the rights unconstitutionally
eliminated by the Frazier-Lemke Act were liens. Section 77B impaired only contract rights as opposed
to property interests. Kuehner, 299 U.S. at 452, 57 S. Ct. at 301-02 ("[Tlhere is, as respects the
exertion of the bankruptcy power, a significant difference between a property interest and a contract
since the Constitution does not forbid impairment of the obligation of the latter.").
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unacceptable alternatives: 1)treating lessors claims as provable and fully allowable;
or 2) treating such claims as nonprovable. Under the first alternative, lessors would
command "too much" ofthe debtor's estate relative toother creditors. Alternatively,
treating lessors' claims as nonprovable would yield an "inadequate" discharge for
the debtor.
The Court indicated concern about liquidating lessors' lost profit claims during
an economic depression. It noted that evidence regarding the market value of the
leased premises: "partakes largely of the character ofprophesy.... Add to this the
fact that bankruptcies multiply in hard times, and that estimates ofrental value are
made upon the basis ofwhat a new tenant will pay in an era ofeconomic depression,
and the estimate becomes even more unreliable .... ." Ultimately the Court held that
Congress could "not unreasonably" have determined that "an award of the full
difference between rental value and rent reserved for the remainder of the term
smacks too much ofspeculation and that a uniform limit upon landlords' clams will,
in the long run, be fair to them, to other creditors, and to the debtor. ' 2" The
statutory cap on lessors' claims replaced an "old remedy inefficient and uncertain
in its result" with a "new and more certain remedy for a limited amount. ' The cap
of three years was not arbitrary but rather gave a lessor a "reasonable chance of
27
restoring himself to as good a position as if the lease had not been terminated.9 1
Moreover, real property lessors could rationally be treated differently than other
unsecured creditors because, in the view of the Court, lessors' rights against the
were different than other creditors' rights. Lessors got their property
debtor/tenant
18
back.
Seven years later, in Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp.,2"9 the Second Circuit

applied Bankruptcy Act section 63a(9) to limit a lessor's allowed claim for lost
profit. The court set out what was to become an influential summary of the history
of Section 63a(9).22' The "limited sacrifice" required of lessors by Section 63a(9)
embodied an "obvious compromise between variotis conflicting interests.., and
was reached only after serious research and study on the part of the legislators."22'
215. Kuehner,299 U.S. at 450,57 S.Ct. at 300-01. The idea echoed by the Court that lessors did
not expect to enforce their nonbankruptcy law right to damages, and would not be unconstitutionally
deprived by a statute to that end, may have motivated statutory provability subject to maximum caps
in the 1934 amendment to the Batlkruptcy Act. Ina 1933 scholarly article, commentators obliquely
described the "feeling" that long term lessors "probably do not contemplate coming in as creditors for
alarge lump sum.... " They noted at that time that "it has been suggested that the statute be amended
to allow damages for alimited period, e.g., five years, but to discharge the entire claim." Schwabacher
& Weinstein, supra note 32, at 238 n.104.
216. Kuehner,299 U.S. at 453, 57 S. Ct. at 302. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
217. Id. at 455, 57 S.Ct. at 303.
218. Id. ("[Lessors] have lost merely a bargain for the use of real estate whereas merchandise
creditors, lenders, and others, recover in specie none ofthe property or money which passed from them
to the debtor.").
219. 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944).
220. Id. at 918. The portion of the Senate Report on Section 502(bX6) cites approvingly to the
Second Circuit's historical summary in Oidden. S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 353-54 (1978), reprinted in,
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6309.
221. Id. at 920.
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The conflict was between full provability of lessors' claims and complete
nonprovability. Nonprovability of lessors' claims was unacceptable to lessors who
after bankruptcy were left holding the bag against defunct corporations. Full
'
provability, although "easilyjustified on technical legal grounds"222
was unattractive
from a policy standpoint. "3 Lessors' claims if provable could potentially be
sufficiently large to thwart the "main object" of the Bankruptcy Act, which was
"rehabilitation of the honest debtor."2 ' Perhaps more importantly, full provability
of lessors' claims would come at the expense of other creditors.22 The court then
observed without empirical reference that lessors' claims if allowed would tend to
be overcompensatory. "[Lessors'] claims... would often be disproportionate in
amount to any actual damage suffered, particularly in the event of a subsequent rise
in rental values." 2 6
The Second Circuit further explained that lessors' claims could fairly be
disallowed while other creditors' claims were allowed in full. "In truth, the landlord
is not in the same position as other general creditors, and there is no very compelling
reason why he should be treated on a par with them.""u The court reiterated the
Supreme Court's observation in Kuehner: lessors got their property back, while
other creditors had no recourse to property. 2 The Second Circuit then added its
own flourish. A lessor's claim for damages could be disallowed in part because the
unexpired term of the lease "in no way benefits the assets of the bankrupt's
estate." 229
At issue in Oldden was the effect of a security deposit held by the lessor on the
lessor's allowed claim under the cap. The trustee argued that the security deposit
should reduce the capped amount of the lessor's claim. The lessor argued that the
security deposit should reduce his claim as calculated under the lease, prior to
application of the cap.'" The Second Circuit held that the security deposit should
reduce the lessor's post-cap claim.23 The effect of the ruling was to enrich nonlessor creditors at the expense of the lessor.' 2 And this effect was consistent with
the purpose of the statute.
In a scathing opinion, the dissent disputed the majority's characterization ofthe
purpose of the statute:
222. Id. at 919.
223. The court noted that provability prior to the amendment to Section 63a(9)"made landlords'
claims depend on the niceties of ancient property law, rather than on the practical aspects of modem
business." Id. at 919. Actually, the provability oflessors claims at that time depended on whether the
parties had adopted specific express terms in their agreement providing for an ipsofacto damages claim
on the tenant's bankruptcy. This condition came about not because of"the niceties ofproperty law"
but from courts' irrational hostility to lessors' damages claims.
224. Id. at 920.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. & n.9 (citing KueJner).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 917-18.
231. Id. at 920.
232. Id. at918.
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But I cannot agree with my colleagues that Congress... designed to
unfeudalize the law ofleases and to do some justice to landlords without
injuring the other creditors of lessees--was activated by any Henry
Georgian animosity to owners of land. It is difficult for me to believe
that Congress has become so collectivist-minded, so opposed to the
common characteristics of our profit system, that it intended that a
landlord should not (to quote my colleagues) "obtain an advantage
merely because he has been shrewd or economically powerful enough to
have obtained a substantial deposit as security" and that landlords should
not "receive different treatment... depending upon the existence and
size of the securities in their possession."" 3
Notwithstanding that its equitable foundation is at best unstable and at worst
nonexistent,
the cap on the allowability ofreal property lessors' lost profit
claims
endured unchanged for the next 35 years. As part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act, Congress deleted the two maximum caps in favor of the sliding scale
discussed in Part 11.234 Congress also for the first time subjected the lost profit
claims of employees against their debtor/employers to partial disallowance.
Section 502(b)(7) disallows an employee's claim for damages resulting from the
termination ofan employment contract to the extent such claim exceeds one year's
worth of salary following the earlier of the filing of the petition or termination of
the contract.2" The legislative history for this section is virtually nil."
IV. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST DISALLOWANCE OF LESSORS'
LOST PROFIT CLAIMS

Congress has explained the cap on lessors' damages claims as necessary to
achieve equitable distribution of assets. The cap "is designed to compensate the
landlord for his loss while not permitting a claim so large (based on a long term
lease) as to prevent other general unsecured creditors from recovering a dividend

233. Id. at 922. Notwithstanding Oldden, some bankruptcy courts have declined to read Section
502(bX6) expressly as an anti-lessor statute. See. e.g., Inre All For A Dollar, Inc., 191 B.R. 262, 263
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (declining to deduct post-petition, pre-rejection rent from lessors' capped
claim); In re Goldblatt Bros. Inc. 66 B.R. 337, 347 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (same). Contra In re
Stewart's Properties, Inc., 41 B.R. 353, 355 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984), In re First Alliance Corp., 126 B.
R. 589,591 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991). TheNinth Circuit BankruptcyAppellate Panel probablyoverruled

both In re Stewart's Properties. Inc. and In re First Alliance in In re First Alliance Corp., 140 B.R.
531,533 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992).
234. See supra note 14.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 502(bX7) (1994).
236. The Senate report states: "(Section 502(bX8)] tracks the landlord limitations on damages...
resulting from breach of an employment contract, but limits the recovery to the compensation reserved
under an employment contract for the year following the earlier of the date of the petition and the
termination of employment." S.Rep. No. 95-989 (1978).
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from the estate." 2" But the intrinsic equity of limiting one claimant's recovery so
as to supplement another's is not obvious.
In Oldden, the Second Circuit noted that real property lessors' claims are
different than other creditors' claims in two ways. First, real property lessors get
the leased property back, whereas non-lessor creditors have no such claim against
property of the estate. Second, the lease, once rejected, is of no benefit to the
estate." Both characteristics ofreal property lessors' claims are true ofall claims
for lost expectation. Neither observation justifies the policy of sacrificing real
property lessors' lost expectation claims to subsidize the claims of other creditors.
A real property lessor who recovers some ofhis loss by reentering the leased
premises asserts a claim exclusively for lost expectation against the estate. The
distinction between the claims of real property lessors and other creditors is
analogous (arguably identical) to the distinction between the claims ofsecured and
unsecured creditors. By physically recovering the leased premises, the lessor
recaptures in part the current market value of his performance. His remaining
rights against the tenant are for lost profit on the contract. Other creditors who
have no right of recourse against specific property of the estate assert claims to
recover the value of their performance plus to obtain lost expectation. Because
they did not bargain for recourse against specific property, these other creditors
start farther back in bankruptcy. It does not follow from this distinction that a
lessor's claim for lost profit is less worthy than the contractual claims of other
creditors.
The second distinction, that the unexpired lease term does not benefit the
estate, does not distinguish real property lessors from other creditors whose claims
are based on rejected executory contracts. All creditors whose claims arise from
rejection are entitled to treat their own executory obligation to perform under the
rejected contract as discharged and recover lost profit by asserting a claim against
the estate. In all such cases, the performance the creditor will never render is of no
use to the estate. But, the value of such performance is not irrelevant. The
creditor's claim against the estate is equal to the creditor's lost revenue less the
value of such performance.
In the case of a real property lease, the value ofthe lessor's performance for
purposes of calculating damages on rejection of the lease is equal to the actual or

estimated present market value ofthe leased premises. The same kind of valuation
obtains for all rejected contracts. Suppose the debtor had contracted for the
delivery of widgets prior to bankruptcy. The trustee then rejected the widget
contract. The seller who never delivered the widgets would be entitled to a lost
profit claim against the estate measured as the difference between the contract price
and the market value of the widgets which by virtue ofthe rejection the seller never
had to deliver. The seller would obtain a claim against the estate for his lost profit
even though the estate does not obtain the use ofthe widgets. 2"
237.
238.
239.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 at 354 (1977), reprintedin, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6309.
See Oldden, 143 F.2d 916, 920, and supra discussion in note 229 and accompanying text.
The same result would obtain if the seller had delivered the widgets prior to bankruptcy
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The Second Circuit's observations about lessors' claims reveals a bias against
claims for lost expectation in favor of claims which combine lost expectation with
compensation for reliance interest. This bias derives from the sentiment that
property value ought to be derived from its use, not its exchange.740 The bias, while
perhaps perceived as axiomatically equitable during the nineteenth century, is out
of step with both contract and bankruptcy theory in the twentieth century.
A clue to the purpose of Section 502(b)(6) might be in the way Congress
limited its application. Only "true" lessors' claims are subject to disallowance
under Section 502.241 This suggests that something about the relationship between
a true lessor and a debtor/tenant justifies disparate treatment for such lessor's
claims relative to claims of the tenant's other creditors. A real property lessor can
assert that its relationship with the debtor/tenant is not a "lease" but rather a
financing lease, a management contract, 242 a storage contract,24 3 or something
else. 2' If successful in recharacterizing his relationship, the lessor can escape the
limitation of Section 502(b)(6) because his claim against the debtor is not
technically "of a lessor." Nor does it "result from the termination of a lease ofreal
property. 2 :4 Once freed from Section 502(b)(6), the court will allow the creditor's
claim in full unless another ground for disallowance under Section 502 applies, or
the trustee avoids or subordinates his claim under another Bankruptcy Code
provision.
The quality ofa "true" lease relationship that might justify treating claims for
breach of it differently than other claims is as elusive as the distinction between
"true" and other leases in the first place. 4 Parties structure their relationships as
"leases" to obtain favorable tax treatment or for other reasons, while their credit
relationships are the functional equivalent of secured financing transactions." 7

subject to apurchase money security interest in them. The contract ofsale would not be executory and
would not be governed by Bankruptcy Code section 365. If the seller successfullyobtained relieffrom
the automatic stay to recover the widgets, the seller's claim against the estate for the deficiency would
be for lost profit on the contract.
240. See Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law and the Maturing ofAmerican Capitalism, 55 Ohio
St. LJ. 291,293, 330-38 (1994). The author chronicles the conflict between republican theorists and
merchantilists in the development of American bankruptcy law which culminated with victory for the
merchantilists in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
241. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 64 (1978). See also In re PCH Assocs., 949
F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1991) ("lease ofreal property" refers only to true leases).
242. E.g., In re Dunes Hotel Assoc., 194 B.R. 967 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995).
243. In re Dant & Dant, 39 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. Ky. 1941), affd sub nor, Kessler v. Jefferson
Storage Corp., 125 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1942).
244. In re PCH Assocs., 949 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Harris Pine Mills, 862 F.2d 217 (9th
Cir. 1988) (timber contracts not leases); In re Morreggia & Sons, Inc., 852 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1988)
(right to occupy store units not lease).
245. II U.S.C. § 502(bX6) (1994).
246. For arepresentative discussion of the distinction between true leases and secured transactions
or sales of personal property see, Robert Strauss & Jeffrey J. Wong, Commercial Law Aspects of
Equipment Leasing, 727 PL/Comm. 7 (1995).
247. See, e.g., In re Kassuba, 562 F.2d 511(7thCir. 1977); In reCentalFoundry Co., 48 B.R. 895
(Bankr. N.D. Ala., W.D. 1985). Both a lessor and a secured lender bargain for a right to reenter
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Although the distinction between true and financing leases is economically
chimerical, 4" it remains a key distinction in bankruptcy. The Code provides no
basis for distinguishing for legal purposes contracts that are economically
indistinguishable. In the report on Section 502(b)(6), Congress noted that
"[w]hether a 'lease' is true or bona fide lease or, in the alternative, a financing
'lease' or a lease intended as security, depends upon the circumstances of each
'
case."249
It cited two specific circumstances which indicate a transaction is not a
true lease: 1)the lessee obtains the property at the expiration ofthe lease for no or
nominal consideration; and 2) the lessee assumes "substantially all the risks and
obligations ordinarily attributed to the outright ownership of the property."' "
. The first characteristic of a true lease, then, is the allocation to the lessor of the
post-performance value of the property to the lessor by agreement of the parties.
Put another way, "true" lessors, unlike other creditors with recourse to property
upon default, expect to "own" the subject property upon the natural expiration of
the term of the credit relationship."' Distinguishing "true" leases based on which
party expects to own the residual value ofthe property at the end ofthe term does
not explain why a true lessor's claim for breach should be subject to disallowance
while a financing lessor's claim is not. The measure of damages for breach of
"true" and other leases is the same--the present value ofthe difference between the
lessor's expected revenue from performance of the lease and the value of the
property upon reentry (or repossession). Which party expects ex ante to own the
residual interest in the property at the natural expiration ofthe lease or loan absent
a breach has no effect on the nonbreaching party's damages claim.
The other characteristic ofa "true" lease Congress identified-retention by the
lessor of "substantially all the risks and obligations ordinarily attributed to the
outright ownership of the property"-is also a non-starter. First, given the
opportunity to bargain, parties can and do allocate risks to suit their purposes, with
the effect that "ordinary" allocations ofrisk have become indiscernible. When the
benchmark allocation of risk disappears, evaluation of a particular relationship
against such a nonexistent standard becomes an empty exercise.
In any event, the true/financing lease distinction does not explain the
application of Section 502(b)(6) to only true realproperty lessors, as opposed to
true lessors of all property, real or personal. The justification for this limitation,
if one exists, must derive from a distinction between real and personal property.

(foreclose) on the subject property upon default. And both bargain for the right of recourse against the
tenant (borrower) to the extent ofany deficiency.
248. Whether arelationship is an assumable lease or afinance contract, according to some courts,
depends on which characterization is better for the estate. See In re Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc., 796
F.2d 1435, 1439 (11 th Cir. 1986); In re Becknell & Crace Coal Co., Inc., 761 F.2d 319, 322 (6th Cir.
1985).
249. Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Sen. Rep. No. 95-598 (1978), reprinted in, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. 5850.
250. Id.
251. The Senate Report states: "[I]n a true lease of real property, the lessor retains all risk and
benefits as to the value of the real estate at the termination of the lease." Id.
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The legislative report notes that historically, real property lessors' lost profit claims
were nonprovable, in part because such claims were "considered contingent and
difficult to prove. ' Reliance on historical treatment of real property lessors'
claims to justify present treatment, notwithstanding changes in both state and
federal law, is unsatisfactory. At the turn of the twentieth century, real property
lessors' rent-based claims were non-provable in bankruptcy cases on grounds that
absent a contract term to the contrary, a lessor's claim for rent could not be
accelerated. During this period, parties increasingly relied on indemnity covenants
to protect the lessor's expectation ofprofit under a lease. Roughly contemporaneous with the enactment of the predecessor to 502(b)(6) in 1934, a lessor proved a
claim for damages notwithstanding prior limitations of the common law and
difficulty of calculation.253 Thus, over forty years before Congress enacted Section
502(b)(6) as part ofthe 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the Court had discredited entirely
any contention that' lessors' lost profit claims were historically sui generis and
deserving of disparate treatment.
True, difficulty of liquidation of lessors' claims played an important role in
judicial attitudes about the provability of such claims. During the early twentieth
century, courts liquidated anticipatory damages notwithstanding a variety of
contingencies across the spectrum of property rights." But, in cases involving
breach ofreal property leases, the doctrine ofanticipatory repudiation was slow to
arrive. 2" And when it did, courts sometimes treated the task ofvaluing a leasehold
interest in real property which extended for years into an uncertain economic future
as insurmountable." After ChicagoAuditorium, however, it became difficult to
justify disparate treatment for lessors' anticipatory lost profit claims on grounds of
difficulty of liquidation. Lessors' lost profit, particularly under an indemnity
covenant which stipulated the measure of damages, was no more difficult to
liquidate than lost profit under the contract for livery services at issue in that
case.2" 7 Problems of liquidation turn on uncertainty regarding values into the
future, a phenomenon that pervades all executory contractual relationships, not just
real property leases.
The cost of liquidating real property lessor's lost profit claims may differ from
the cost ofliquidating other claims for anticipatory relief if the cost of valuing real
property interests are greater than the costs of valuing non-real property interests.
The conclusion that land is "unique" so that specific performance is presumptively
available as a remedy for breach of performance involving an interest in real
property may reflect consensus that real property interests are more costly to value
than other interests. If real property lessors' lost profit claims raise peculiar

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See discussion of ChicagoAuditorium, supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See In re Roth & Appel, and discussion supranotes 98-113 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 177.

257. All contingent or unliquidated claims are costly to estimate. See generallyJackson, supra
note 4, at 44.
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problems of liquidation, however, Section 502(b)(6) does not solve them. It does
not eliminate the need to liquidate lessors' lost profit claims under state law.23 8
Section 502(b)(6) may, however, reduce the cost of liquidating real property
lessors' claims.259 Parties will bear the cost of liquidating a lessor's lost profit
claim only when the amount of such claim is relatively close to the maximum
allowed claim under Section 502(b)(6). Conversely, when all parties concede that
the lessor's state law claim exceeds the statutory cap, they will not undertake the
cost of precise valuation of the lessor's state law claim.
The administrative appeal of capping claims to reduce liquidation costs is
clear. Yet capped claims are the exception not the rule in bankruptcy. The reason
for restraint in the use of caps may be the cost associated with the risk that a cap
is too low relative to the optimal claim size. If the error cost exceeds the
administrative benefit (cost saving) of capping a bankruptcy claim, then the cap is
not justified on cost reduction grounds.
Professor Thomas Jackson and others contend that the optimal size of a
creditor's bankruptcy claim should equal the creditor's rights against the debtor
outside ofbankruptcy except when alteration of such rights maximizes collective
value. 2' Jackson describes the risk of error associated with rules that alter
nonbankruptcy entitlements. Disregard of creditors' nonbankruptcy entitlements
other than to maximize value for all claimants "creates incentives for particular
holders ofrights in assets to resort to bankruptcy in order to gain for themselves the
advantages ofthat rule change, even though a bankruptcy proceeding would not be
in the collective interest of the investor group.""26 Even if real property interests
raise peculiar valuation problems, the appropriate corrective ought to be the
province of nonbankruptcy law. 62

258. The lessor must still establish extent ofhis lost profit under the lease and applicable state law.
E.g., Inre Financial News Network, Inc., 149 B.R. 348, 350-53 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1993); Inre Bob's
Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 143 B.R. 229,231 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992); Inre Atlantic Container Corp., 133 B.R.
980, 989-90 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1991); Inre Conston Corp., 130 B.L 449, 451-54 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1991); Inre McLean Enter., Inc., 105 B.R. 928,937 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1989), contra, Inre Stewart's
Properties, Inc., 41 B.R. 353, 355 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984).
259. See, e.g., Inre All For A Dollar, Inc., 191 BR. 262, 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (The cap
"sacrificed the precise calculation of contingent future rentals in favor of the benefits of a quickly
calculable estimated claim.").
260. Jackson, supra note 4, at 28-33.
261. Jackson, supranote 4, at 33. Seealso TimothyJ. Muris, Opportunisilc Behavior and the Law
ofCoantracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521,532-52 (1981); Michael C. Jensen &William H.Meckling, Theory
ofthe Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.Fin. Econ. 305,31215 (1976). Jackson gives the treatment of lessors' lost profit claims under Section 502(bX6) as an
example ofa bankruptcy rulethat alters nonbankruptcy entitlements without perceptible gains in social
wealth. He calls the stated justifications for the cap unsatisfying on their own terms. Jackson, supra
note 4, at 57.
262. SeeJackson,supra note 4,at 57 (arguing that bankruptcy law ought not correct for problems
ofliquidation).
[E]ven though a state law (assuming it existed) that generally treated landlords relatively
better than other claimants might be an inappropriate nonbankruptcy policy, recognition of
that differential treatment nonetheless rmains appropriate bankruptcy policy.... Casting
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Whatever peculiar problems of valuation might arise in the context of long
term leases of real estate, bankruptcy courts are perfectly capable of estimating
damages from breach of long term leases. If the trustee or debtor in possession
assumes the lease, but later breaches it, the lessor is entitled to an administrative
claim for his full damages as estimated by the bankruptcy court, unaffected by
Section 502(b)(6).'
Even assuming difficulty of liquidation is more pronounced with lessors' lost
profit claims than other breach of contract claims generally, Section 502(b)(6) is
overbroad. Congress did not limit Section 502(b)(6) to apply only to lessors' lost
profit claims that are unliquidated. Section 502(b)(6)(A) caps all claims that
"result[] from the termination of a lease of real property." Courts have held that
it applies even if the lessor's claim is reduced to judgment as of the time of the
bankruptcy filing. 2" Disallowance of part of a state court judgment by a
bankruptcy court raises a concern that the bankruptcy court is not affording the
'
Bankruptcy courts reason that
judgment the required "full faith and credit."265
concept. Since the nonbankbankruptcy
a
Section 502 governs claim allowance,
the allowability of
considered
have
not
ruptcy court rendering the judgment could
claim under
lessor's
the
of
part
of
the lessors' claim in bankruptcy, disallowance
2"
judgment.
the
to
credit
and
Section 502(b)(6) does not deny full faith
Application ofSection 502(b)(6) to disallow part of a lessor's claim which has
been reduced to judgment prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case flies in the face
of both the historically derived rationale for disparate treatment of lessors' claims
and the justification based in difficulty ofliquidation. Ajudgment entered in favor
of a lessor pre-petition is not contingent or speculative as of the filing of the
bankruptcy case. Such a claim would have been entirely provable under Section

the issue as one ofbankruptcy policy misstates what isat issue and creates incentives to use
bankruptcy for reasons that may not be collectively optimal.

Id.
263. E.g., Nostas Assocs. v. Costich (Inre Klein Sleep Products, Inc.), 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1996).
264. E.g., Inre Comstock Fin. Seres., Inc. 11 B.R. 849, 859 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (for claim
allowance purposes, bankruptcy court is not bound by prior state court judgment except with regard to
state court determination of the nature ofthe claim and amount of damages under state law); Kohn v.
Leavitt-Berner Tanning Corp., 157 B.R. 523, 526-27 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (bankruptcy court honors state
courtjudgment as to the character and amount oflessor's damages, then applies Section 502(b)(6XA)
to disallow such claim notwithstanding judgment).
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994); Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure:
*Jurisdiction §4469 (1981 & Supp. 1999); Marrese v. American Academy ofOrtho. Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373, 380 (1985).
266. E.g., Cutler v. Lindsey (Inre Lindsey), 199 B.R. 580 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd in unpublished
opinion, No. 96-2268 1997 WL705435 (4th Cir.Nov. 7,1997); Kohn v. Leavitt-Berner Tanning Corp.,
157 B.R. 523 (N.D. N.Y. 1993); In re Thompson, 116 B.R. 610 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re
Comstock Fin. Serv., Inc., I I B.R. 849 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990); In re Bus Stop, Inc., 3 B.R. 26
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). The bankruptcy court may look behind the judgment to determine the true
nature of the claim. E.g., Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 7 S.Ct. 576 (1887); Inre Bus Stop, Inc. 3
B.R.26 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980); Cutler v. Lindsey (Inre Lindsey), 199 B.R. 580,583 (E.D. Va. 1996);
Kohn v. Leavitt-Berner Tanning Corp., 157 B.R. 523, 526 (N.D. N.Y. 1993).
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63a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act as a debt "absolutely owing., 267 This application of
Section 502(b)(6) starkly illustrates its effect as an incentive for strategic behavior.
A tenant faced with a lessor's perfectly valid state court judgment for lost profit
can flee to bankruptcy and escape part of it. In this setting, the only effect of
disallowance is to enrich the debtor and his non-lessor creditors at the lessor's
expense simply because the debtor sought refuge in a federal bankruptcy
proceeding.
The sacrifice oflessors' claims for damages in bankruptcy may really be based
on intuition that such claims tend to be overcompensatory. The tacit sentiment is
that lessors under rejected leases get the leased premises back from the estate, and
they should be happy with that. This intuition appeared prominently in Kuehner,

in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the precursor to Section
502(b)(6)." The Court observed that lessors' claims could rationally (and thus
constitutionally) be disallowed in bankruptcy because lessors received a remedy in
bankruptcy that other unsecured creditors did not-lessors got their property back
from the debtor. 69 Thus, lessors did not truly need full recognition in bankruptcy
of their damages claims, while other creditors did.
Of course, lessors whose rights are disallowed bargained for both a claim
against the tenant/debtor and recourse against the property. A bankruptcy rule that
disregards this contractual allocation creates a disincentive on the parties to real
property leases to allocate risk of loss this way. Lawyers drafting real property
leases no doubt prefer simply to allocate risk among lessor and tenant in other ways
rather than challenging Section 502(b)(6) as an unconstitutionally irrational
abridgement of due process. During periods ofgeneral economic stability, rental
values will correspond closely with market values. Under these conditions, a
lessor's lost profit claim from her tenant's anticipatory breach of lease is likely to
be relatively small. So, during these periods, it is not surprising that Section
502(b)(6) causes little stir. Of course, tenants occasionally make very bad lease
deals in good times, potentially yielding a large lost profit claim for a lessor. In
many of these cases, given the likelihood of a small dividend to unsecured
creditors, the stakes are often too low for serious litigation over the effect of
Section 502(b)(6) on claim disallowance. The effect is to force lessors and their
tenants to adopt alternative, and less efficient allocative devices.
Suspicion that lessors' damages claims as measured under state law are overcompensatory reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of lessors'
claims. Recall early in the twentieth century courts commonly limited a lessor's
right to recover lost profit as exclusively derivative ofthe lessor's right to rent." 0
But a lessor's damages will be less than lost rent revenue as long as the lessor can
267.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 63a(l).

268. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. See alsoOldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d
916, 920 (2d Cir. 1944) (landlord is not in same position as other creditors: "he regains his original
assets upon bankruptcy, and the unexpired term in no way really benefits the assets of the bankrupt's

estate.").
269. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445,455,57 S.Ct. 298, 303 (1937).
270. See supra discussion note 45 and accompanying text.
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recover some revenue by reletting or otherwise exploiting the premises. Put
another way, rent will always overstate the lessor's damages when the value of the
leased premises is positive.
The intuition that lessors' damages claims were systematically over-compensatory never had any observable basis. In a competitive commercial setting, absent
fraud or collusion, a lessor cannot extract a supercompensatory remedy from a
lessee, at least not without substantial rent concessions. In the unusual case in
which a lease contains a supercompensatory penalty damages provision, the
lessor's claim would be disallowed under Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(1) to
27
the extent it would not be enforceable (as a penalty) under state law. '
Certainly, when a lessors' claim for damages from breach of lease has been
reduced to judgment outside of bankruptcy, it ought to follow that absent fraud,
collusion or corruption, the judgment reflects the lessor's equitable claim against
the estate.272 In this context, if the lessor's judgment is truly overcompensatory, for

example because the lessor obtained it by fraud or collusion, it is likely avoidable
73
And, if the
under Section 548 governing fraudulently incurred obligations.
or
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default
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bar
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the
then
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its
otherwise lacked incentive to defend
74
court.
relitigation of the issue of damages before the bankruptcy

Perhaps the clearest conflict between the redistributive effect of Section
502(b)(6) and equitable bankruptcy policy occurs when the debtor is solvent. In
these cases, disallowance of a portion of the lessor's claim does not make other
unsecured creditors better off. They will be paid in full in any event. Rather,
disallowance enriches the holders of equity interests at the expense of the lessor.
It is one thing to contend that bankruptcy law ought to engage in equitable
adjustment of claims among creditors. It is quite another to contend that
bankruptcy policy ought to sacrifice the claims of a single type of creditor (real
property lessors) to enrich the holders of equity interests.
The effect of Section 502(b)(6) when the debtor is solvent first appeared in
Kuehner. The Court in that case held that disallowance is absolute, even if it
enriches equity claimants .2 The issue reappeared in In reFederatedDepartment
Stores, Inc.276 In that case, a real property lessor objected to the debtor's motion to
reject the lease. The lessor argued that the debtor-in-possession was solvent, so
that rejection of the lease, coupled with disallowance of the bulk of the lessor's
271. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1994) (claim disallowed to the extent that it is"unenforceable...
under any agreement or applicable law .... ).
272. Cf BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757 (1994).
273. II U.S.C. § 548(b) (1994).
274. See Murray v. Day (Inre Day), 4 B.R.750,755 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (issue preclusion
does not apply tojudgments by default). See generally James N. Duca and Cor Ann C.Yokota, The
Role of Res Judicata In Bankruptcy Claim Allowance Proceedings, 17 U. Haw. L Rev. 1 (1995)
(discussing the effect on res judicata of the debtor's insolvency and concomitant lack of incentive to
defend against entry ofjudgment).
275. Kuehuer v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445,450, 57 S.Ct. 298,299 (1937).
276. 131 B.R. 808 (S.D. Ohio 1991).

278

LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 60

claim under Section 502(b)(6) would yield no benefit to creditors but would result
in a windfall to equity claimants. 2" The district court upheld the bankruptcy
court's denial of the lessor's objection on grounds that rejection is appropriate
wherever it benefits the debtor, even if it does not benefit unsecured creditors."
The lessor repeated the same argument another way. It argued that disallowance would be inconsistent with Congress' redistributional purpose because the
debtor-in-possession was solvent.'" The court held that Section 502(b)(6)
unambiguously applied in all cases, not just those in which the debtor was
insolvent."' In any event, the court explained that the enrichment of equity
claimants at the expense of a real property lessor was not inconsistent with
Congressional intent. "[T]he bankruptcy court's decision serves at least one of the
purposes of [Section] 502(b)(6): to limit damages claimed for breach of a longterm commercial lease, which have historically been viewed as contingent and
"'
difficult to prove."28
Like the Second Circuit in Oldden v. Tonto Realty, 82 the

court in In reFederatedDepartmentStores held that Congress' intent for Section
502(b)(6) requires courts to single-mindedly minimize lessors' lost profit claims
for no reason other than to reduce the recovery of such lessors in bankruptcy cases.
V. CONCLUSION

Disallowance of lessors' claims under Section 502(b)(6) is the product of a
fascinating confluence of legal and economic events. By the beginning of the
twentieth century, contract theory had expanded to permit a party to recover his lost
expectation from a breaching party, without actually tendering his own performance. Parties to real property leases used indemnity clauses to create expressly
a lost expectation remedy for lessors. Such a remedy was an innovation in real

277. Id. atgl0-11.
278. Id. 812-13. The districtcourt noted that the bankruptcy court disputed whetherthe debtor-inpossession was indeed insolvent. Moreover, the bankruptcy courtwas concerned about the implication
of the lessor's motion, that acourt must conduct asolvency analysis in connection with each rejection
motion. Id. at 813.
279. Jd.at 816.
280. Id. at 816, 817 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S. Ct.
1026, 1030 (1989)). "There is simply nothing in the plain language of [Section] 502(bX6) to suggest
that a bankruptcy court may depart from the application of the cap on a lessor's claim any time the
debtor is solvent or the court otherwise believes the equities ofthe case might warrant such adeparture."
Id.at 817. The district court noted that in In re Danrik, 92 B.R. 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988), another
court refused to apply Section 502(bX6) to cap a lessor's claim against a solvent lease guarantor. The
court in In re Federated Department Stores,distinguished In re Danrik inter alia, because the lessor's
claim in that case reflected the market value of the premises for the remaining term, and was
"proportional" because 70% of it consisted of out-of-pocket expenses. Id. at 817. The lessor's claim
in the instant case had no such equitable appeal. "In contrast, in the instant case, it appears that the
majority of City Center's $10 million claim consists of lost rent payments." Id. The leased premises
at issue was aretail store in a virtually vacant mall in Grand Rapids, Michigan while that region was
undisputably "economically depressed." Id. at 810.
281. Id. at 818 (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2266 (1978)).
282. See supra discussion of Oldden, note 219 and accompanying text.
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property leases, and in the view of some, an affront to the common law wheretofore
a lessor had no right to recover lost expectation. During this same period,
economic depression made the scope ofbankruptcy relief a pressing political issue
in the 1930's. Congress' response to political pressure for expanded bankruptcy
relief was to sacrifice the nascent and theoretically dubious, yet potentially huge
expectation interests of real property lessors. Thejustification fordisallowance of
part of lessors' claims under Section 502(b)(6) is entirely unconvincing today.
Although Congress has constitutional power to alter state law entitlements via
bankruptcy law, Section 502(b)(6) is not a justifiable use of that power and ought
to be repealed.

